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West Europe Report

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SPD'S VOIGT ON TF, DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 23 Mar 81 p 2

[Article by Peter Wivel]

[Text] "The leftwing of the Social Democratic Party of Germany also considers Brezhnev's 'moratorium proposal' unacceptable. But the balance of terror is not enough to guarantee peace, so consequently the dialogue must continue," says Karsten Voight of the Social Democratic Party of Germany in this interview.

Detente in Europe is to a large degree the child of West German social democracy, the SPD's 'East-policy' in the seventies. With the rearmament of central Europe, it would appear that this policy is in ruins today.

But has detente failed? We have asked the opinion of 39 year old Karsten Voight, a Social Democratic member of the Federal Diet. Voight is one of the most prominent representatives of his party's moderate leftwing. He was formerly vice chairman of the Young Socialist, the rebellious youth faction of the Social Democratic Party of Germany. The interview was conducted in fluent Danish, since Karsten Voight attended Social Democratic high schools in Denmark for a number of years in the sixties.

He answers: "Detente has not at all failed. We have had many successes in the relations between East and West. Just think of all the peace treaties we have concluded with the East. If they had not been made and if the detente policy had not been as secure as it now is, we would have had a new Berlin crisis after the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian crisis, and a very serious cold war would have threatened central Europe. At the moment the situation in Europe itself does not constitute a danger to the detente policy. Tensions and conflicts originate in regions outside Europe--right now I want to leave out the special problem of Poland.

"But with the situation as it is, it may be said that Europe has the task of contributing to stabilization in other regions of the world to the extent that it is possible through political and economic means.

"We have in Europe a constant relatively stable zone, and this is not to be threatened. We want to capitalize on this relative stability and success in detente policy to stabilize other regions of the world."

Unacceptable

Karsten Voight agrees with the liberal West German foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher that President Brezhnev's proposal for a "moratorium" in stationing medium-range missiles in Europe is unacceptable. Neither the government nor the Social Democratic and Free Democratic parliamentary delegations consider it acceptable as it is now formulated, he says.

Why? Because the analysis of the Social Democratic Party indicates that the Soviet Union has a clear superiority in medium range missiles at present and a moratorium would make permanent this superiority. But Voight adds, "naturally when Genscher goes to Moscow at the beginning of next month, he will obtain more information as to what the proposal actually means."

Voight emphasizes that the Soviet president has stated that he is willing to continue disarmament negotiations in SALT, and the Americans for their part are ready to negotiate with their NATO partners, perhaps now concerning disarmament priorities within the alliance.

Only a Beginning

He hopes that Brezhnev is serious when he says that the moratorium proposal is only the beginning of negotiations on disarmament on both sides of the alliance in central Europe.

"We must look at that more closely, for, if he is willing to reduce the number of SS-20 rockets--and that we consider necessary--it is a good sign that new agreements can be reached in East-West negotiations."

Karsten Voight does not find it suprising that there is in the Social Democratic delegation in the Federal Diet a minority which is dissatisfied with the foreign minister's demonstratedly hard line towards the Soviet Union. The Social Democratic Party of Germany has a long tradition of detente and disarmament, so the party "tries really to exploit all possibilities which can further East-West talks."

"Hence, we can't just say no to Brezhnev's proposal in its present form. Over and above that, we must go to the Soviet Union and determine if that inadequate proposal can be expanded and if the Soviet Union is willing to reach a compromise in our direction."

He emphasizes, however, that the large majority of the SPD group is in agreement regarding the moratorium proposal as unacceptable in its present form. "But no possibility shall be left untried."

Detente means a lot to West Germany, and also to Denmark, Voight adds. In case of a conflict the national existence of both Denmark and West Germany hang in balance, he says.

"In a sense it is clear that on the one hand we consider an adequate defense necessary so no one in the East contemplates attacking us, but on the other hand we insist that a balance of terror is not enough to guarantee peace. Hence, the East-West dialogue must be kept up.

"That is also what we discuss with our American friends, that is, if they emphasize as much as we arms limitation."

"Do they?"

"No, not just as much now. We do not say no to adequate defense. But it is clear that we as Social Democrats believe that political priority should be given to arms limitation negotiations. Now, I don't have any illusions that arms limitation negotiations have the same significance, the same priority for them as for us.

"But I think that it is necessary that Europeans discuss this political priority with the Americans, and that the view we have is not regarded as disloyal to the NATO alliance but on the contrary that we are only being true to an old tradition.

"Fortunately, that view is supported in the north, in the Benelux countries and in West Germany. But if you look, for example, at Great Britain today or southern Europe, we can well say that the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan has had a more negative influence on the climate for detente."

"This has resulted in the British-American proposal for establishing a so-called 'fire-fighting unit,' a Rapid Deployment Force in the Persian Gulf area. What is the position of the Social Democratic Party of Germany to this?"

"It is quite obvious that one can not ignore the fact that certain regions of the world can be stabilized by military means. But priority should be given to political and economic means, and we must be particularly careful that Europe is not regarded in other parts of the world as a reborn neoimperialist force. Every effort at stabilization must take into consideration the views, prevailing in the countries one wants to support."

Karsten Voight emphasize that a West Germany military contribution to actions outside the NATO area is completely precluded.

Help to Turkey

He has just participated in a trip by a parliamentary delegation to Turkey which is getting extensive military-technical and economic help from the Federal Republic, and I asked him if that assistance could be regarded as stabilizing.

"We have considered the situation many times with our friends in Bulent Ecevit's Republican People's Party in Turkey. And they have told us that if we break the tie between Turkey and the rest of Europe and economic assistance, it will not contribute to stabilizing the political situation in Turkey, nor will it improve the situation in regard to human rights, desired by both Ecevit's party and the SPD.

"But on the other hand, it is quite clear to us that continued help is contingent upon rapid progress towards the restoration of democracy in Turkey. If that cannot be guaranteed, there is a danger that we cannot in the future mobilize parliamentary support for economic assistance."

Role as Mediator

"During the seventies West Germany acted as a kind of mediator between East and West. How is that role being fulfilled today?"

"Our role is within the Western alliance. And within that alliance we are trying to contribute to improving the common Western strategy. Our priority here is emphasizing the significance of a dialogue between east and west and north and south.

"We emphasize defense, but we recognize that it is not enough. We should rely on economic, political and social stability, without which democracy and the interests of the West can not be guaranteed."

"Let us contribute to developing independence in the Third World. Let us not give the Third World the impression that we regard everything in the framework of the East-West confrontation, but that we recognize that the peoples in the Third World have their own special problems."

West Germany, of the three great powers in the European Community: Great Britain, France and West Germany, appears to be most interested in detente. Why is that?

"We are not just interested. We have contributed to two world wars, and the SPD has always had a strong peace tradition. Our very geographical location, our historical tradition both as a nation and as a Social Democratic party, makes it a very natural thing for us to pursue the goal of stabilizing the peace, and as far as possible with reduced military expenditures without succumbing to hollow illusions."

"That is our national and party contribution. It is a new German tradition, a sign from a new Germany which has developed since the war. And I think that those countries which do not always approve our policies have reason to be pleased with this new tradition and, moreover, that it is as stable as it appears to be at the moment."

6893
CSO: 3106/106

NAP ACTIVIST METHODOLOGY DETAILED

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 22 Mar 81 pp 1,7

[Text] Ankara, CUMHURIYET BUREAU -- It was learned that searches conducted on various dates since 12 September of the NAP [Nationalist Action Party] Youth Chapters Headquarters and auxiliaries turned up important documents showing monthly ammunition requirements by area, area watch lists, photographs and sketches of people with opposing views, income and expense information forms, organization arms lists and descriptions of organizational and action methods.

Information Forms by Wards

According to information obtained, among the records seized in the searches were documents, some handwritten, some mimeographed, showing the income, expenses and ammunition requirements of the wards under activist domination.

The ward information forms were arranged by month, each divided into four sections of organizational income and expenditures, administrative expenses, average monthly ammunition requirements and organization-owned arms. On the ward information forms, organizational income consists of receipts from business, market dues and magazine sales; organizational expenditures consist of travel assistance, assistance to the families of martyrs (term used for escapees), aid to idealists in jail and special reserve funds. Administrative expenses on the forms are "police station, taxi - shared taxi, paint - brush." Average monthly ammunition requirements and numbers of "organization property" weapons are also given on the forms.

The form for the Bahcelievler Ward shows the organization's income on 13 August 1980 in this ward as 40,000 liras recieved from business, 40,000 liras collected in market dues and 10,000 liras from magazine sales for a monthly total of 90,000 liras. Under organizational expenditures, it is noted that there is no "travel," but 10,000 liras was spent on "police station, taxi - shared taxi and paint - brush." The average monthly ammunition requirement in Bahcelievler is recorded as 5 boxes and organization-owned guns as "1 small domestic and 1 small Czech."

The monthly ammunition requirement and "organization property" guns shown for certain wards are:

Haskoy-Dortyol -- ammunition requirement: 5 boxes large, 3 boxes small; organization property: 1 long Astra 9, 1-7.65 Baretta. Haskoy -- ammunition requirement: 6 boxes; organization property: 1 Barebellum. Haskoy-East -- ammunition requirement: 10 boxes; organization property: none (managed by individuals). Senyuva -- ammunition requirement: 1 box; organization property: 1 small domestic. Emek --ammunition requirement: 1 box; organisation property: 1 (we cannot get from citizens). Cankaya-Yildiz -- ammunition requirement: 6-7 boxes; organization property: 1-7.65 Czech, 2 shotguns.

Another document is a detailed account balance sheet of the Seker Student Dormitory's canteen and restaurant, showing monthly income of 612,372 liras after paying the workers.

List of Incident Participants

One document found at the Youth Chapters gives a "list of those in incidents in Gultepe." The list of incident participants is separated into three parts under Revolutionary Road, Revolutionary Left and Liberation and those in each section are classified as "sympathizer," "fanatic" or "organization member." Information is also given about those on the list as to address, place of employment and routes used.

Notes about certain people were also found written on scratch pads and calendars. Notes about some people told where they worked and said, "Let him leave work."

Photos and Sketches

Among the documents seized were large numbers of photographs and sketches of individuals or groups. On some of the photographs, there was an "o" to show those who would be killed and an "x" to show those who had been killed.

Tribal Family Notebook

A notebook divided into two sections under the names "Akdere Family" and "Kirkagac Family" shows the residents of all homes in the area where these families are located and indicates whether they are "leftist," "rightest" or "fanatic." Some apartments are described as: "Those who live here are leftists, their names are unknown."

For each house, the names of residents, their schedules, the routes they use and their telephone numbers are given in the notebook as well as in certain other documents. An "o" is placed beside certain names to show they were to be killed.

Zone Charts

Among the records found was a cardboard chart approximately 30x90 centimeters showing the names of all zones of Ankara with symbols indicating whether the zones were under their control or had passed to other hands.

The zone chart is divided into four sections: institutions of higher learning, shanty zones, city wards and high schools. In the institutions of higher learning section, the status of all such institutions except the Faculty of Political Science and the Higher School of Press and Publications is indicated by shading in pencil. In other units, a plus sign is used for zones definitely under their control.

Watch List

A doucment titled "Ward Watch List" gives the names of those who would have guard duty in their controlled regions or critical locations during a month.

Another document found shows a "neighborhood activist list" and gives information about these people. It also contains neatly drawn charts showing where these people live.

Another document contains a list showing, by ward and address, from whom and how much money can be requested. Notes are jotted beside some names and addresses, one of note being: "Amar Ticaret, worth visiting twice."

What To Do If Tortured

An article consisting of four or five handwritten pages gives "information for fellow idealists" on "torture and behavior under torture," explaining how one should act under torture.

Another document contains reports compiled on certain people. The reports, compiled on seven people, give information about them and their views and end with the inscription "May God protect and exalt the Turk."

A document titled "Block Aid List" gives the names of those in prison who would be given aid. On their printed list of those to be investigated, there was written beside one person who was designated as one of theirs but whose situation was considered suspicious, "Arrested at his home, situation may be investigated."

8349
CSD: 4907/232

PAPER COMMENTS ON INCREASED OIL BILL FROM USSR

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 13 Feb 81 p 2

[Editorial: "Increase of Oil Bill Must Be Taken Seriously"]

[Text] Finland's import bill for raw oil grew last year by 56 percent. Crude oil alone constituted a fifth part of all import expenses. The total energy import bill is getting to be close to 30 percent of all imports.

No special concern, however, is evident in Finland. In the forefront of public opinion there has even been a satisfaction over the fact that expensive oil makes possible large exports to the Soviet Union. Much less attention has been accorded to the fact that this increasing export constitutes an uncompensated transfer of income to a foreign country.

The lessened demand for oil in the world market and the sizable stock-piling by the purchasing countries have lately weakened the sellers' changes to increase prices. There is even a certain amount of pressure to cower prices. It has been predicted also in Finland that the price of crude oil will increase by about 10 percent over this present year.

The reality, however, is quite different. The dollar price of crude oil imported from the Soviet Union has already gone up by over 10 percent on the basis of the current price agreement. Strong increase in the dollar's exchange value raises the additional bill for imported USSR crude oil, calculated to be FMK 1.1 billion, to somewhere around FMK 1.7 billion.

The energy import bill is also raised by the increased price of coal. This has gone up by about a fifth, mainly because we have had to substitute for the Polish import purchases from more distant countries. All in all, the Finnish costs for procuring import energy are rising more rapidly than those in other countries. This weakens the competitiveness of the Finnish products and adds to the population's housing and living expenses.

It is likely that the unexpectedly high increases in costs and prices will contribute to making the income solutions more difficult. Intensification of energy-saving measures is however the only efficient way of minimizing the effect that increasing transfer of income abroad has in accelerating inflation and creating economic difficulties.

Good opportunities exist for savings, because our achievements in these matters have clearly been more modest than those achieved in many other countries. We cannot continue to disregard the swelling of the import energy bill ad infinitum.

9571
CSD: 3107/70

STATUS OF NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM REPORTED

Athens O OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDROMOS in Greek 26 Mar 81 p 29

[Interview with Dr Ioannis Kostopoulos, manager, Empasco company, by correspondent G. Papanikolaou]

[Text] One of the issues reopened by the recent earthquakes in Greece was that of the establishment of nuclear power plants here for the production of electric power.

As is known, as of about the beginning of last year the company Empasco Services Incorporation, in its capacity of technical consultant to the DEI [Public Power Corporation], undertook (among other things) to study the likely areas for siting these plants. Given the increased seismicity which the Greek area shows and which we were reminded of by the recent earthquakes, certain questions have arisen concerning the safe establishment and operation of nuclear power plants in Greece.

In connection with this subject, Minister of Industry and Energy St. Manos stated that the searches which are being conducted by the American company "aim at pinpointing those areas which fulfill all the safety prerequisites for the establishment of a nuclear plant."

In order to more fully investigate this issue, O OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDROMOS made inquiries at the company itself, raising certain questions which were answered by Empasco's manager for the Greek region, Dr Ioannis Kostopoulos.

Of course, the answers to these questions cannot be said to be distinguished for their explicitness, but they do open a certain small window on the big affair of the country's more general nuclear program.

It is a fact that by the end of this year or the beginning of the next, we will know what the safe areas are where the nuclear plants of the DEI can be sited, according to Empasco.

Question: The seismicity of the Greek region, which appears to cover the entire country, is surely creating problems for studies on the installation of "sensitive" structures such as those of nuclear power plants. In what way and to what extent is this being taken into consideration in the comparative examination of possible sites for locating nuclear plants in Greece, which Empasco is conducting?

Answer: Contrary to the general impression, extensive seismic activity does not cover the entire region of Greece. There are relatively large areas where no damage from seismic activity has ever been recorded. The seismological conditions of Greece are being considered by Empasco through the most modern and up-to-date procedures, in its studies on nuclear sites (Editor's note: As Kostopoulos stated to us, in its studies Empasco is following the regulations and prerequisites set by the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), in searching for likely areas for locating nuclear units in Greece).

Question: Following the recent earthquakes, which demolished the myth about the greater capital area being earthquake-free, do you believe that the Lavrion and Karystos solutions ought to be ruled out now?

Answer: The recent earthquakes have not "demolished the myth of the earthquake-free character of the greater area of Athens," as your question supposes. Can you imagine the ruins in which this city would lie if it were located on the northern side of the Isthmus of Korinthos, near Agios Skinos? The city of Athens is full of old buildings of faulty construction, and the general level of earthquake resistance incorporated in the planning and construction of these buildings is disgraceful even today.

The recent earthquakes were an insignificant hardship even for the poorly-constructed buildings of Athens, which corroborates the long history of low seismicity in this city and in the northern Kyklades generally.

The Lavrion and Karystos sites appear to be likely ones, along with a number of others, at the stage of the survey which we have reached up to now. Nevertheless, however, it may be decided later that Lavrion is located too near to downtown Athens.

Question: What areas in Greece are considered to be disallowed by your studies for the location of a nuclear plant?

Answer: Because of the strict international regulations, a number of areas where there are concentrations of population, surface rifts from earthquakes in the past as well as from those of the recent events, and in general areas which contain other elements which exempt them for environmental reasons, are not suitable for the establishment of nuclear units. Detailed reports on our studies will be forwarded at a suitable time via the DEI and the appropriate special organizations.

Question: Nearness to seismological areas is not necessarily prohibitive to the establishment of a nuclear plant. Particularly when this distance is short, at what point and by how much does this lead to increased costs?

Answer: As was stated, the regulations which we are following virtually forbid the locating of a nuclear unit within a radius of 8 kilometers from a geological fault which may be able to cause shifts, earthquakes and surface fissures. At the commencement of our studies on siting areas in Greece last year, it was agreed between the DEI and Empasco that we will make every possible effort to avoid areas within a radius less than 20 kilometers from such geological faults.

Cost increases resulting from increases in the standards of construction because of possible earthquakes are recognized by all the experts as significant. Inasmuch as every nuclear unit up to now has been constructed individually, there are no general comparisons which have been published and which refer to the increase in construction costs due to some specific level of seismicity.

Question: Do you believe that the recent geological changes in the Greek region will prolong the length of time needed for your studies, or will require an investigation on a new footing? When do you expect to complete your study?

Answer: The last series of earthquakes tallies exactly with our understanding relative to the seismic history and the tectonic development of Greece. The Korinthos area has a long history of powerful seismic activity. Large earthquakes, which may have happened along the same geological fault each time, have struck at least 11 times in the last 2,000 years.

For this reason, the last earthquakes do not have any effect on our studies of various areas, and these studies will be continued at a steady pace, with our taking into consideration the needs of the country and the safety of its inhabitants. We expect to identify a number of safe areas for the Greek nuclear program in the coming months--that is, not before the end of 1981, and probably sometime in 1982 (Editor's note: The contract between the DEI and Empasco has a 2-year term and expires in March 1982).

12114
CSO: 4908/134

SUBSIDIES FOR TRADE WITH GDR NOTED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 18 Mar 81 p 9 Excerpt

[Article by Wolfgang Hohmeyer: "Trade with GDR Strongly Subsidized. In Leipzig They Do Not Like the Mention of Subsidies"]

> [Excerpts] Trade between the two German states flourishes as never before, despite the deterioration of relations between the FRG and the GDR attributable mainly to the latter for raising the trade volume minimum. Last year alone goods worth 11.7 billion marks were traded. This exceeded the 1979 volume by 19 percent and established a new record. The political importance of this bilateral flow of goods was stressed by GDR State Council Chairman Erich Honecker at the Leipzig Fair, when he characterized economic relations as "the forerunner of the process of detente." Of course, the flow of goods received some help: West German companies receive annually a subsidy of about half a billion marks from tax revenues for the goods imported from the GDR.

Normally, every FRG importer is obligated to pay a 6.5 or 13 percent import tax for goods imported from abroad. But the tax does not apply to goods from the GDR and in addition German law accords these goods special treatment as if the German tax had already been paid on them, which means that the "before tax deduction" rule applies for the West German buyer. Even though the deduction is only "fictitious" it is very real on the books.

Specifically, this means that a West German enterprise can reduce its tax obligation to the revenue office by 11 or 5.5 percent of the value of the goods purchased in the GDR. Thereby Bonn subsidizes indirectly deliveries from the GDR with the 1980 subsidy amounting to a least half a billion marks. Exact figures available for 1979 indicate that the subsidy was 460 million marks, a respectable sum.

It is revealing that, because of the order of magnitude of these subsidies, West German buyers do not like to talk about the details of their transactions. Mostly their only comment is that it is business as usual and that many transactions are being concluded at other times too, not just during the fair. The companies' spokesmen always stress that the tax rebates have already become "part of the calculations." But the real significance is that GDR products sold by enterprises would no longer be competitive on the West German market if Bonn abolished or at

least modified these "fictious before-tax deductions": Instead of buying in Leipzig or Magdeburg they would be forced to make their purchases in Taiwan or Singapore. But would anybody in Bonn wish to redirect the flow of goods?

Taking into consideration these implications, the makers of Germany-policy in Bonn will find it difficult again this year, in view of the political cooling process, and considering the increase in the compulsory exchange of currency, to make a hard decision. The next few days in Leipzig will show where German-German community of interests in economic matters is leading.

8664
CSO: 3103/279

BUDGET CUTS FOR SOCIAL POLICY ITEMS PLANNED

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 30 Mar 81 pp 19-21

[Text] The federal budget cannot be financed just with higher taxes and even more debts. So Minister of Finance Matthoefer is planning drastic cuts in the social area. He and SPD budget experts want to save money on the unemployed, university and high school students: The "phase of expanding social services is over."

The letter that Rudi Walther, budget expert in the SPD Bundestag fraction, sent recently to his Bundestag colleague Eugen Glombig was friendly only in its greeting.

"Dear Eugen," speaker for the SPD social politicians, was told by his party friend that "the truly dramatic situation" of the federal budget was forcing them "to search for ways to save in all areas." Glombig could see straight away from an enclosure where saving could be made, according to the ideas of the budget strategists.

Each Bundestag delegate who has to concern himself with public services on an internal committee received similar letters. According to the preliminary warning, civil servants would have to expect budget cuts that will affect them adversely.

Exactly 4 months after their coalition negotiations, the social liberals are preparing to catch up on what they neglected then and to trim the inflated consumption expenditures in their budget. FDP budget expert Klaus Gaertner scents a "breath of budgetary structural law" in the capital.

Still embarrassed, and by allusions, the coalition partners are preparing the citizenry for the fact that it is facing what was not supposed to happen during the entire legislative period until 1984: the economic downturn and the low state of the government treasury are forcing the minister of finance to eliminate legally established social services.

According to Social Democrat Hans Matthoefer in the finance committee of the Bundestag, the government must now "make the transition from a phase of expanding social services to the phase of a healthy balancing of social security and individual responsibility."

SPD chairman Willy Brandt was also at great pains to lend support to the need to save with well-chosen words. The offer of the social state, in Brandt's words, contained "not only the community's duties to the citizen, but also social obligations of the citizens in relation to the state." It has been clear to the minister of finance for a long time that cuts have to be made somewhere, and deep ones at that. In the capital it is accepted as a certainty that in 1981 Matthoefer will have to borrow over DM 35 billion instead of the planned DM 28 billion in new debts.

Not only the financial plans for this year are questionable. Preliminary outlines for coming years, written into middle-range financial planning, are already inaccurate.

The finance minister's economic experts had rejected the over-optimistic assumptions of Minister for Economics Otto Count Lambsdorff in an internal analysis back in January. They arrogantly dismissed Lambsdorff's prognosis that the GNP would grow in real terms at an average of 3.6 percent between 1982 and 1985, as a "very ambitious estimate."

But if the growth rate is lowered to a realistic level, then, Matthoefer's experts calculated, "the number of unemployed and the jobless rate in 1985 will be above those of 1981."

Yet unemployment can scarcely be paid for this year. At the beginning of April the board of the Office of Labor in Nuremberg will request a supplement from the finance minister. Size: at least DM 3.5 billion.

Then this year Matthoefer must add almost DM 10 billion from the government treasury, approaching five percent of his total budget, for unemployment money and job assistance. "I cannot imagine," suspects Ehrenberg's planning chief Werner Tegtmeier, "that the finance minister will go along with that on a permanent basis."

The official's suspicions are correct. Without Ehrenberg's knowledge, at the end of last year Matthoefer had the president of the Government Accounting Office, Karl Wittrock, draw up proposals about where cutbacks could be made in the Nuremberg office's budget. Wittrock sent 20 pages of recommendations, dated 11 December, to the finance minister. He proposed savings of at least DM 1.5 billion.

Matthoefer liked the list. He quickly passed it on with the warmest wishes to the budget experts of the coalition parties. While Ehrenberg was still requesting an additional DM 500 million for measures to create jobs in a letter to the chancellor, the social-liberal budget professionals in the Bundestag had long before prepared papers containing cutback proposals.

Accountants and delegates selected, in the main, items of expenditure that are protected by law. So they can only cut by a new parliamentary resolution--by a budget insurance law.

If matters go according to Matthoefer and his allies in the budget committee, then:

--unemployed persons, who receive additional training in their field, will receive only 75 percent of their net salaries, instead of 80 percent, from the Office of Labor;

--in the calculation of unemployment compensation, vacation pay and the 13th month's salary will no longer be included, and in this way about DM 150 million can be saved annually;

--employees, who give notice without good reason, will in future wait 8 weeks instead of 4 weeks for their unemployment compensation;

--people who are looking for full-time employment, but during this period are temporarily working less than 20 hours per week (legal moonlighting), will not draw unemployment compensation;

--payments for the so-called problem unemployed, such as drug addicts, who are enrolled in school courses, will be curtailed radically.

The delegates also want to put an end to the practice that is current in business of firing employees at the age of 59, paying the difference between unemployment compensation and the last net wage for a year, then pensioning off those affected. In future the companies will be responsible for a larger part of the cost of this type of personnel policy, if the dismissal action is part of a social plan. Individual cases will not be tolerated at all.

The social politicians, startled by the planned cuts, feel themselves immediately reminded of 1975. At that time, legally guaranteed social services were eliminated under the heading "Pruning Runaway Growth." Now, the social experts suspect, cuts are to be made under the slogan "Reducing Abuse."

It may seem some consolation that, besides the social budget, special attention was paid above all to the personnel budget of the civil service. In the view of the financial planners, a total of DM 500 million can be saved there.

The suggestions will probably meet with approval only outside the ranks of the civil servants, for the plans call for 3,000 positions to be cut, possible promotions to be delayed and the raising of positions to be forbidden. All dynamic bonuses, whether for the police or fire service, are to be frozen. If the budget planners are in fact successful, officials will have to be satisfied with a one-half percent smaller salary increase than OeTV [Public Service, Transportation and Communications] boss Kluncker's workers and employees, or wait at least 3 months longer for the raise.

In addition, the experts want to prune the budget of Minister for Education Bjoern Engholm. Total expenditures for university and high school students under the Federal Law for the Advancement of Education (Bafoeg) are to be frozen at their present level of about DM 2.4 billion. As part of the plan the number of those receiving support would have to be reduced soon.

But all these cuts would not be sufficient to reduce the nation's growing debt in the next few years. Since the budget experts clearly do not dare to make

additional cutbacks, they want to try to increase income--such as through higher champagne and tobacco taxes, or through higher contributions to unemployment insurance.

Public officials and self-employed people are to make a special contribution. These groups, who until now have paid nothing to the Office of Labor in Nuremberg, are to have a tax of one percent of their gross incomes imposed on them for the unemployment exchequer, according to the intent of the social democratic financial planners. It would bring in about DM 2 billion. It is now gradually becoming apparent to the social liberals in Bonn that no major group of West German society can be spared, when it is a question of cutting back the government budget to meet the lean years to come.

Resistance will probably be stirred up above all among the Social Democrats, because it is they themselves who have to restore the social state to health and because, of all people, those lowest on the social order are to help with contributions for the budget cleansing.

Many party members are irritated anyway. For while the social budget is in abeyance, the defense budget is receiving an above average boost. The FDP's Gaertner describes the mood in Bonn: "Anyone tampering with that is tantamount to an honorary Russian."

9581
CSO: 3103/278

PETROCHEMICAL PROGRAM CONFRONTED WITH DIFFICULTIES

Athens O OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDROMOS in Greek 26 Mar 81 p 3

[Article by And. Papagiannidis]

[Text] Three events, outwardly unconnected with each other, have occupied the columns of the international economic press in recent days. Perhaps it will seem strange, but from these news items an important message emerges for the development strategy of Greece.

1. The indications are multiplying that the oil-producing countries are laying new foundations for their investment policy in the sector of petrochemicals. Conservative countries such as Saudi Arabia as well as more venturesome ones such as Mexico are seeking to form three-cornered relations with the builders of their petrochemical complexes and with businesses which utilize petrochemicals as a raw material. Their purpose is to ensure the marketing of these products so that their productive capacity will not remain unutilized.

2. In a recent decision, the European Communities' Commission vetoed support for a Dutch outfit based on petrochemicals production, on the grounds that any increase in the present productive capacity will have negative consequences because of the continuing crisis in the market. There were especially strong interjections on the part of various member states on the commission, whose purpose was to stress the "structural dead end" for petrochemicals and their unfavorable future prospects.

3. The international press featured as a "prominent item" the concluding by the ELEVME [Greek Industrial and Mining Investments Company] of a financing agreement involving $146 million, via Lloyds Bank, for the purpose of covering a portion of the construction costs for the petrochemical complex which Greece has commissioned to a British firm. And according to recent statements, its aim will be to complete this complex "soon."

From the conjunction of these three news items, the question reasonably arises concerning whether the promoting of petrochemicals constitutes a prudent investment choice for Greece. In fact, what we have here is a major investment scheme which was promoted vigorously particularly in the days of the change in government--with that being in fact the chief occasion for the creation of the ELEVME as a new investment agency for the public sector. The goal of such investing was both to find substitutes for imports and to develop exports.

Despite the fact that the branch of petrochemicals already was showing disquieting symptoms, the reception of this scheme was vigorously positive.

But gradually, many aspects of the problem began to change--all of them negatively. First of all, the efforts made to base this complex on domestic raw material failed: The Thasos petroleum was deemed unsuitable, its natural gas inadequate, and the idea of using lignite did not make any headway. The result: Greek petrochemicals will be based on an imported raw material (ethylene)--hence, not only the value added which they will provide but also the net foreign-exchange benefit decreases. Another result was the onset of the continuing shifts of location for the petrochemical complex, which are suggestive of a hesitant waltz. Next, the international situation with respect to this branch continued to worsen. The steady increase in oil prices means ultimately a rise in the cost of the raw materials which are utilized, and the excessive investments at the beginning of the last decade have created a lasting surplus of productive capacity, while the general crisis keeps the demand low for the final products. The result: A veritable trade war among producers, constant accusations of dumping, and the creation of an acknowledged price cartel. Finally, the conditions of competition are being falsified more and more: Cheap natural gas as a raw material in America because of years of price controls, non-commercial criteria for operating the complexes in the Eastern countries--and, the final turn, the creation of huge complexes by oil-producing countries which have an abundance of raw material and enjoy a powerful negotiational position in the international market.

How is it, then, that within such a dismal environment the Greek petrochemicals project has gone ahead? One answer is perhaps that by the time the complex is in operation, the market will have begun to run smoothly again. But was not the same argument raised also in 1977? Another answer is that what we have here is an important basic industry of an almost strategic character, concerning which one's decision should be based on long-range criteria: But can one seriously assert something of this sort for an industry with an imported raw material and without assured distribution markets? A final answer is that petrochemicals have become, or have been allowed to become, a chief element in the government's policy on industrial investments in connection with its initiative in the public sector. That is, the ELEVME's operations have been centered around these petrochemicals, Karamanlis as premier and all the ministers of industry have spoken in support of them for years now, while initiatives of foreign policy have been directed toward them (the last financing-construction package was the result of the British expansion of Mitsotakis). Therefore, how is one to make it understood that the emperor has no clothes--or worse, that the emperor has not had any clothes for some time now?

12114
CSO: 4908/135

CONSERVATIVES' DRIVE TO ENTER COALITION SUFFERS SETBACK

Modernization Program

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 22 Feb 81 p 2

[Editorial: Party Program Modernized]

[Text] The Conservative Party has lately been refurbishing enthusiastically both its surface and substance, and this has also involved rewriting and modernizing the program of principles. This activity has been spurred on by an obviously intensified aspiration to put the party in a shape that would make it a fitting governmental partner for others--it will have shortly been sitting in opposition for 15 years.

Just like its predecessors, the draft for a new party program puts an emphasis on the individual; however, it appears that in many other respects there will be changes from the current program that are fairly palpable, and even more so when comparing the outline with the 1957 program.

The Conservative Party has already faced many problems in the innovation project, among the first was trouble in defining the economic system it now supports. Less than a quarter of a century ago, the party idolized a social market economy. According to the present program, economic activity should be based on a free market economy attainable through further development of the mixed economy.

The most conspicuous change in the draft is the attempt to renew the party's relationship with the communists. As early as 11 years ago, the Conservative Party removed from its party program the section dealing with opposition to revolutionary communism. The present program proclaims that the party is opposed to all activity which aims at changing our democratic system.

Nothing similar to this had been included in the new draft. According to it, the party would see it necessary merely to forestall centralization of political and economic power. It would value highly the existence of all parties and other groups that are reforming society through peaceful means, and it would cooperate with them on an equal basis.

The extremely scanty foreign policy part of the present program would be supplemented also by what the party board added to the program of goals in 1972. At present, this program places high priority on increasing citizen awareness so that our neutrality policy based on the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line could be further developed and enriched.

The program of principles would now use the official term "peace-oriented neutrality policy," and it would be noted that this basic direction of Finnish foreign policy, called the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line, leans on the yya agreement in its essential parts.

If the party congress in May ratifies the draft as the party program even approximately as it is, the Conservative Party will now admit to being in many ways different from what it was before. It would mean that the party will have removed its cornerstones from the political right to nearer the center.

One of the purposes in formulating the program is of course to strengthen Conservative Party support. It is difficult to predict if the present draft will be helpful in attaining this. However, it is possible that some sections of the draft might be too much for the most conservative wing of the party--it might drive them to exercise more vigor in scouting out the small rightwing parties.

Another question is how the program reform will affect the political configurations and the prospects for government cooperation. Of course this matter is not for the Conservative Party alone to decide. It will depend on how the other parties react, and show reaction, to the reform.

The Center Party will possibly feel that the Conservative Party is intruding ever more boldly in its fishing waters. For tactical reasons, the Social Democratic Party will not easily form a government with the Conservatives if the Communists are not also included. For the Communists again, the Conservative Party is an altogether unfit governmental partner.

For normal parliamentary expediency, it would be most natural that formation of majority governments would generally be directly dependent on the election results. The government would be formed by the section of the political field which won the elections, regardless of whether nonsocialist or socialist. This would enable the people to consider better than now the different alternatives when voting.

However, as long as we have the present political divisions in the Diet, it is hard to envision a formation of a completely nonsocialist majority government. Not only is this section of the political arena very scattered, but it is possible that one of the small parties could be too troublesome a government partner even for the Conservative Party. So, no matter what the Conservative Party does, its prospects of being in the government are not very promising.

Maki-Hakola Hits Foreign Policy

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 22 Mar 81 p 20

[Text] If the government of the country is on a collision course, so is also the country's biggest opposition party, the Conservatives. This prediction was made by Pentti Maki-Hakola, 52, who is the mouthpiece of the party's extreme right.

In Maki-Hakola's opinion, the Conservative Party has swelled into being an emporium of ideals. The party image has become less clear and more leftist, and the entire party is being shaken by an ideological crisis.

Maki-Hakola is demanding that the Conservative Party reinstate the traditional values; he is demanding that the party find an opposition candidate to the present party chairman Ilkka Suominen for the party congress in May; and he is demanding that the party return to its former secure stance on the right of the Center Party.

Maki-Hakola wrote last week in the VAASA newspaper an unhesitatingly harsh text which he summed up with the statement that if the country does not have a straightforward rightwing party, the blue and white colors of the flag will start changing to the hues of red.

In his article, Maki-Hakola envisioned that even Antero Jyranki was "rubbing his hands in anticipation" as the Conservatives, with the chairman at the mast, are giving in in the matter of protection of private property rights, and are just about to give permission to chip away property value by an ordinary law, without any compensation to boot.

Maki-Halola has worked for years on matters concerned with land properties and compensation questions and says that he has learned to understand how essential it is to protect private ownership rights. In his opinion, the constitutional law has to be interpreted in this matter literally and unconditionally. "You must not give in an inch, otherwise you'll end up burning your fingers. The party leadership does not seem to believe this."

Maki-Hakola does not have a high regard for the "jovial" Ilkka Suominen as Conservative Party chairman. There is no disputing that the Conservative Party has glided to the left during his chairmanship, and the chairman even has encouraged this interpretation through his public statements, Maki-Hakola said.

So Maki-Hakola hopes Suominen will have a rival candidate in the party congress in Helsinki. A contest for the chairmanship would activate the field and generally would create a more democratic impression of the Conservative Party, where the expression of differing views has decreased during the Suominen reign, said Maki-Hakola.

If a suitable opponent is found, Maki-Hakola predicts that a very even race might ensue for the chairmanship.

According to him, the traditionally Conservative voters are not at all satisfied with the present solutions and stances.

"Maybe it is a question of nostalgia, but it seems that during the current chairmanship, values and views have become less strong. A certain mustiness has crept in, and clear-cut rightist expressions of opinion are missing." Maki Hakola suggests.

He complains that Chairman Suominen does not seem to be able to shed his views dating from the "renovation" period: "It tends to be true in political life that if you take as much as one step in a certain direction, it is easy to keep on going..."

Maki-Hakola swears he is not aspiring to become Suominen's opponent. He says he is aware of his own drawbacks: "I and my views have been so decisively branded that my mere person would drive away some who are against the present leadership but still could not vote for Maki-Hakola."

Making me into a candidate for the chairman would be unwise also because the young people have such a strong foothold in the party congress. About a third of the party congress representatives can be moved about to support a certain favored candidate."

Maki-Hakola quips at the leadership of the young Conservatives and says that they and their views are unbelievably narrowly based.

"My contact with the field is so close that I can say most of the young voters behind the Conservative Party are thoroughly rightwing," says he.

The Conservative Party--An Emporium for Ideals

In Maki-Hakola's opinion, the National Conservative Party is threatened above all by an ideological crisis. "The party has incorporated ideologically such a motley group that it is no longer possible to please everyone. This state of affairs leads to the party losing its credibility."

In Maki-Hakola's opinion, it is possible to be all things to all people as long as only world-embracing statements and platitudes are needed. But as soon as it is time for practical decisions, there is a clash; the gravel law is an example of this.

The Conservative Party cannot long continue in the Suominen-instigated emporium fashion, Maki-Hakola says. "A steady conservative grip" should be again applied, and "a clear Finnish national quality" should be emphasized. It would bring the party new supporters, even though some of the present ones might defect; and the result would be unification of the party.

Maki-Hakola complains that there is a dangerous generalization being made that the party is about to bypass the Center Party on the left.

Keeping a Careful Tongue in His Head in Discussing Foreign Policy

As he has acquired the name of a foreign policy enfant terrible, Maki-Hakola says he is going to keep his "tongue in the middle of the mouth" and to "put his words forth with precision" from here on. Even if the party leadership is anticipating it, he is not going to say anything for which he could be admonished.

The Conservative Party clarified its foreign policy line a couple of weeks ago in the party council meeting and anchored itself more firmly to the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line. The chairman of the party is urging the membership to hold onto this line firmly "without adding anything to it or removing anything from it."

Maki-Hakola announces that he supports the country's official foreign policy: "It is obvious that we have to continue in the line we have chosen, no matter what it is called, even the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line. The name is not as important as the matter itself," he says.

The Conservative Party leadership also has been irritated by the fact that Maki-Hakola has not always remembered to keep quiet about his Kekkonen-antipathies.

Maki-Hakola has never been a president's man. He was voted in as an elector for Matti Virkkunen in 1968 but did not consent to becoming a Conservative Party electoral candidate for Urho Kekkonen in 1978: "The presidential candidate was not a Conservative, and generally has not been very positive towards the party. The electoral results proved that the field did not approve of him either."

Vote Magnet Intends to Stay in the Party

Civil engineer (geodesy) by education, and born in Nurmo, Maki-Hakola became a Conservative Party member in the early part of the 1960's and a Diet member in 1966. From then on, he has enjoyed strong support in Southern Ostrobothnia. With his 8,700 votes in the last election, he was the king of the votegetters.

Some young Conservatives and Suominen supporters are hoping that Maki-Hakola will drift out of the party with his extremist opinions and fall into oblivion in the manner of Kullervo Rainio and Salme Katajavuori, but Maki-Hakola is determined to disappoint them: "At no point have I had any need or desire to leave the party."

Maki-Hakola has acquired a taste for political life. "The more deeply I have plunged into things, the more interesting I have found politics. I have experienced much personal growth, and I will not voluntarily give up the task of being a Diet representative of the Conservative Party," he says. But he does emphasize that he remembers that the voters have their own say in this matter.

Conservative Youth Want Suominen

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 24 Mar 81 p 7

[Text] Unto Hamalainen, the chairman of the Conservative Party Youth Union, recommended reelection of the conservative Party Chairman Ilkka Suominen.

Hamalainen enphasized that Suominen has enhanced the Conservative Party especially in his foreign policy activity as a promoter of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line.

Hamalainen stated at the same time that he hopes the rightwing opposition group of the Conservative Party will have its own candidate for chairman at the party congress in May. In Hamalainen's opinion, it is necessary that the Conservative Party votes to clarify different political lines; this would clear the air within the party.

The accusations by the ultra-conservative wing of the party concerning Chairman Suominen and his supporters have been very serious, as for example in the recent debate over the gravel law. The party congress must have the right to measure the extent of support the ultra-conservative wing enjoys within the party, said Hamalainen.

Also the rightwing group of the party has been discussing the possibility of putting up an opposition candidate to Suominen. Pentti Maki-Hakola, a Diet member, has publicly called for an alternative to the present chairman.

Kanerva To Keep Party Post

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 25 Mar 81 p 8

Diet representative Ilkka Kanerva (Conservative Party) does not aim at becoming his party's third vice chairman. He does not consider it necessary to establish a new post of a third vice chairman for the party. He also thinks that this would only cause unnecessary squabbles about individuals.

Two proposals have been submitted to the May party congress that the party create a third vice chairmanship post after the fashion of the Center Party. Kanerva has been touted as the strongest candidate for this post.

Kanerva's refusal at this early stage might mean that the entire project is buried. The party leadership is unlikely to be very willing to auction off the post, which might result in the entrance of a rightwing representative in the party leadership.

The party government of the Conservatives is soon going to publish their opinion of the proposals made by the Youth Union and Raision Conservatives on the matter.

The Conservative Party congress is going to be held in Helsinki on May 15-17. So far, no counter candidate has been found for Chairman Ilkka Souminen regardless of the fact that there is strong internal opposition. Also the positions of the vice chairmen, Tapani Morttinen and Else Hetemaki-Olander, appear to be strong. The entire leadership has announced their willingness to continue to serve.

9571
CSO: 3107/69

POLL: CONTINUED DROP FOR SKDL, RISE FOR CONSERVATIVES

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 1 Apr 81 p 10

[Text] The SKDL's [Finnish People's Democratic League] decline continues. Its support has dropped by a whole percentage point since the last basic municipal election returns. The Finnish Gallup Company polled support for the [different] parties in February-March and found that only 15.6 percent of the voting population were SKDL supporters.

The Conservative Party and the Center Party (KEPU) have increased support for themselves more than that with a rise of 0.9 percentage point over the October municipal election results recorded for both of them.

The SDP [Social Democratic Party], supported by 25.1 percent of the voting population (down .4 percent), still retains its position as the biggest party. It is followed by the Conservative Party with 23.9 percent, the KEPU with 19.6 percent and the SKDL with 15.6 percent.

Of the small parties, both people's parties are on the downgrade. The Liberals' depressing situation has become even gloomier than before and the party's support has already dropped to less than 3 percent. The Finnish Christian League and the Finnish Rural Party have both increased their support since the municipal elections.

No party preference was given on 22 percent of the responses [to the poll].

The poll, commissioned by the four big parties, came up with several records in the political history of the country. Support for the SKDL as well as for the left as a whole was at its lowest in a long time. On the other hand, support for the Conservative Party was higher than ever before.

Support for the parties participating in the Koivisto government has dropped. In the October municipal elections 65.5 percent of the voters supported the four government parties. At the time of the poll, there were a little under 1 percent fewer supporters for them.

Support for the Parties

	Finnish Gallup Poll Spring 1981	Change Since 1980 Municipal Elections	Change Since 1979 Parliamentary Elections
Social Democratic Party	25.1	-0.4	+1.2
Finnish People's Democratic Party	15.6	-1.0	-2.3
Conservative Party	23.9	+0.9	+2.2
Center Party	19.6	+0.9	+2.3
Swedish People's Party	4.5	-0.2	±0.0
Finnish Christian League	4.1	+0.4	-0.7
Finnish Rural Party	3.7	+0.7	-0.9
Liberal Party	2.9	-0.3	-0.8
All socialist parties	40.7	-1.4	-1.1
All nonsocialist parties	58.7	+1.4	+2.1

11,466
CSO: 3107/74

PAPER COMMENTS ON CP LEADER'S TALK WITH KEKKONEN

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 11 Apr 81 p 2

[Editorial: "President's Position Should Be Protected From Candidate Competition"]

[Text] Prime Minister Mauno Koivisto has finally won by a fall in the wage agreement dispute that has blown up into such a big issue. On Friday the government turned over to Parliament those bills which the other parties to the wage agreement, especially the labor organizations, had long been expecting of it.

The government decision was formally unanimous. Differences were passed on along with the bills to Parliament and the committee, which have instructions to reach agreement on any possible changes by mid-September. Thus the government can now breathe easily and get ready to deal with major issues.

A notoriously exceptional political game, played for high stakes and which was followed with astonishment, preceded the government's decision. SKP [Finnish Communist Party] chairman Aarne Saarinen's behavior a week ago, which gave rise to confusion, made this game a matter of public knowledge.

Right after conferring with President Kekkonen, Saarinen said that he got the impression that the president at least wanted to change prime ministers in the government. Saarinen now adds that the news that a government of officials was contemplated in place of the Koivisto government confirms the impression he then had that the government was crumbling.

There is no reason to doubt chairman Saarinen's report of the talks he had with the president nor the impression he got. It is also pointless to criticize him for having revealed the plan to bring Koivisto down, which might even have cost the scrapping of the present broadly based government coalition.

Certain other features of this game are more deserving of notice than Saarinen's behavior. We must start with the fact that the impression he got of the president's situation — which Saarinen spoke of then — was based on information given him by the political districts. Therefore, the factions, whose influence has been so significant, cannot have been very unimportant.

As to the question of what these "factions" are, we can hardly expect to ever get an answer, as interesting as that might be. They have now quickly fused into another faction, since the executive organs of all the government parties say that they support continuation of the government and increased cooperation.

Thinking of continuation has produced new deliberations. From the standpoint of attending to national affairs, it is indispensable for us to arrive at a state of affairs in which the president is not involved in tactical maneuvering at the government level or which takes place among the parties. It is reasonable to expect that the president should be allowed — and should himself be able — to discharge his demanding duties without being burdened by the quite obvious race that is going on behind his back under the heading of decisions on future aspirants.

The question is thus to how great an extent the president should be left to do his job in peace. To protect that [right] there is good reason for the parties to stay within the framework provided by the parliamentary system, which offers enough room for normal political competition.

11,466
CSO: 3107/74

RELATIVE STRENGTH OF CP FACTIONS HARDLY CHANGES AS CONGRESS STARTS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 7 Apr 81 p 7

[Text] The CP (SKP) party congress elections have produced no surprises. The participating factions had thrown up such heavy defenses about their districts that after the elections were over on Sunday the majority faction had captured nine districts and the minority faction eight.

Altogether 522 party congress delegates will be attending the SKP 19th Party Congress from 22 to 24 May, their chief goal being to radically clean house within the party leadership and in terms of methods of operation. At any rate, a lively debate is expected to precede the party congress.

The SKP majority faction controls the following districts: Etela-Savo, Helsinki, Jyvaskyla, Kainuu, Lapland, Oulu, Pietarsaari, Satakunta and Vaasa. The minority-controlled districts are: Etela-Karjala, Joensuu, Kuopio, Kymenlaakso, Lahti, Tampere, Turku and Uusimaa.

As of Monday there were still no detailed results, but it was clear that the districts have not changed owners. In May 296 delegates from majority-faction districts and 226 from minority-faction districts will be coming to Culture House [SKP headquarters] in Helsinki. So the majority faction will have 70 more seats than the "Stalinists" at the party congress.

Election liveliness was the same as it has been throughout the whole time the dispute has lasted, that is, all forces were recruited to vote for their own [delegates]. In terms of the positions candidates assume, party delegates do not essentially deviate from the type that has prevailed before at party congresses. Delegates are clearly either majority or minority-faction activists. There are perhaps fewer bureaucrats among the congress delegates now than before, which is a result of the generally widespread aversion to bureaucrats among the rank and file.

Although unofficial, individual results on the different factions' percentage of the vote will be forthcoming by the end of the week.

The SKP party congress is in advance regarded as an opportunity to scrap old methods of operation and principles governing relations. There is a powerful opinion bloc in the majority faction which is demanding that minority-faction representation on the SKP Central Committee, in the Political Bureau and the chairmanship be reduced. They are also demanding that the supremacy of the officials be broken.

Returning to a state of respect for the rules — as SKP chairman Aarne Saarinen has demanded — would be based on the assumption that the SKP abandon its second vice chairman. The vice chairmen are Taisto Sinisalo and Olavi Hanninen, the second chairman of the Finnish Confederation of Trade Unions.

It is believed that Saarinen will continue to be the SKP chairman, even after May. But otherwise, new blood may be introduced into the top leadership of the SKP.

11,466
CSO: 3107 /76

CP MODERATE WING INCREASES FORCES IN HELSINKI

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 11 Apr 81 p 11

[Article: "SKP Majority Faction Gets Slightly Higher Vote, But Elections Preserve Distribution of Power"]

[Text] The relative positions of the majority and minority factions were fairly well preserved in the CP (SKP) party congress elections. According to the results published Friday, the SKP majority faction increased its support by 0.7 percentage point over that it received in the last elections. Since there were no changes within the district organizations, party congress seats will be distributed as predicted.

Thus 296 majority-faction delegates and 70 fewer minority-faction delegates, or 226, will attend the SKP 19th Party Congress to be held in Helsinki. The congress will be held at the end of May.

The SKP majority faction received 58.3 percent of the vote in the elections that ended last Sunday. The party minority faction got 41.7 percent of the vote. The distribution of votes published by the SKP Information Section was based on the largest number of votes received for one of the two factions' list of candidates in each district organization.

According to the results, the majority faction increased its franchise most in comparison with the last elections in Turku, Kymenlaakso and Satakunta. Majority-faction candidates also had better than average success in the Helsinki and Uusimaa district organizations.

As for the minority faction, it achieved its best successes in Etela-Savo, Tampere and Etela-Karjala as well as in Lapland. Percentagewise, the minority faction's biggest success was in Kainuu where, during the last elections, the minority faction had no candidates listed.

The percentage of votes cast rose slightly in comparison with the last party congress elections; so both factions increased their vote counts. Voting was animated to the extent of 53.5 percent, whereas it amounted to 52.3 percent in the last elections.

The majority faction increased the number of votes it received in the previous party congress election by 1,395 and the minority faction by 661. All told, the majority faction got 15,779 votes and the minority faction 11,263.

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CSO: 3107/76

CP CHIEF SAARINEN ATTACKED BY SDP, CENTER PARTY

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 11 Apr 81 p 7

[Text] CP chairman Aarne Saarinen was publicly reprimanded by KEPU [Center Party] and SDP [Social Democratic Party] leaders on Wednesday on television's "Studio A" because Saarinen had publicly reported on a conversation he had with President Urho Kekkonen.

SDP party secretary and Trade and Industry Minister Ulf Sundqvist felt that it was unheard of for a guest of the president to have "practically held a press conference" on what the president said and meant.

KEPU chairman Paavo Vayrynen too said that he was surprised at Saarinen's behavior. "The president did nothing more than to urge the government to hurry up in reaching certain decisions. All other discussion on the matter is pointless," Vayrynen said.

Last weekend Saarinen related as news from Tamminiemi that at least Prime Minister Koivisto (Social Democrat) was certain to leave the government. Saarinen also reported that relations between Kekkonen and Koivisto are really bad.

On television Vayrynen reiterated the position the KEPU assumed on Wednesday, namely, that the government cannot be split on such an essential issue as the Pekkanen agreement in the social affairs package. In Vayrynen's opinion, the government will not have time enough to reach agreement on the contents of this package by Friday, but "Parliament must function in accordance with the normal procedures."

Sundqvist felt that the government parties can reach unanimity on the matter by Friday. "I am hopeful," Sundqvist said.

SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] chairman Kalevi Kivisto felt that "haste will now make it impossible for the government to engage in negotiations before Friday."

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CSO: 3107/76

POLL SHOWS SOCIALISTS, CENTER PARTY VOTERS FAVOR KOIVISTO

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 11 Apr 81 p 8

[Text] According to a poll conducted by the Finnish Gallup Company, satisfaction with the government headed by Prime Minister Koivisto (Social Democrat) has grown. According to the poll, satisfaction with the present government is greater than during any previous year since 1976.

According to the poll, which was commissioned by the four biggest parties, 66 percent of those polled were mainly satisfied with the current government and 18 percent were mainly dissatisfied with it. Sixteen percent of those who participated in the poll could not take a stand on the issue.

The poll was conducted from 27 February through 23 March of this year and all told 1,256 people were polled.

Satisfaction with the current government was almost as great among Social Democrats and Center Party supporters and satisfaction has increased in both parties. Among SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] supporters satisfaction is now greater than it was a year ago, although less than in 1979. The number of satisfied members in the SKDL is on the whole less than in the other big parties.

Among Conservative Party supporters satisfaction with the Koivisto government is also considerable and its popularity among them has risen by 10 percent since last year.

Among supporters of the Social Democratic Party 77 percent (70 and 77) are now (the figures in parentheses are the corresponding percentages for 1980 and 1979 respectively) mainly satisfied with the government headed by the Social Democratic prime minister, 11 percent (19 and 7) are dissatisfied with it and 12 percent (11 and 16) could not say.

Among SKDL supporters 46 percent (44 and 49) were satisfied, 39 percent (37 and 30) dissatisfied and 15 percent (19 and 21) could not say. Therefore, debate on the government issue has apparently sharpened, since the number of supporters who did not take a stand on the issue has declined. The same development also applies to Conservative Party and Center Party supporters.

Among Center Party supporters 76 percent (earlier 67 and 66) favored the government, 12 percent (17 and 15) were dissatisfied with it and 12 percent (16 and 19) could not say.

In the Conservative Party 68 percent (in the preceding years the figures were 58 and 57 percent) were satisfied with the Koivisto government. This year 23 percent (31 and 21) were mainly dissatisfied with it and 9 percent (11 and 22) did not voice an opinion.

Among supporters of other political parties than the four biggest, 68 percent (earlier 56 and 64) were also satisfied. Ten percent (29 and 18) of this group were mainly dissatisfied and 22 percent (15 and 18) could not say.

Conservative Party Into the Government

During the Gallup poll commissioned by the four big parties the question was also asked as to how important the participants felt it was that the Conservative Party had been taken into the government.

Fifteen percent of those polled felt that the Conservative Party's entry into the government was indispensable, 47 percent that it was necessary, 17 percent that it made no difference, 10 percent that it was needless, 4 percent harmful and 7 percent could not venture an opinion.

Thus altogether 62 percent felt that the Conservative Party's entry into the government was either necessary or indispensable.

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POLL SHOWS FEAR OF WAR SOMEWHAT REDUCED

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 11 Apr 81 p 8

[Text] The threat of war is still the public's first concern. About a third, or 31 percent of the respondents in an opinion poll conducted by Gallup and ordered by the four biggest parties in March felt that the preservation of world peace was of primary concern.

Slightly more, or 34 percent, of the respondents were primarily concerned over world peace in the previous poll, taken last April-May. However, this opinion bloc now clearly retains its position at the top since in the March poll the employment situation, which 10 percent of the respondents cited as of primary concern to them, occupied second place as the primary concern of respondents.

Other items of primary concern were making ends meet and income levels (8 percent of the respondents), health-related matters (8 percent) and environmental pollution (6 percent). These percentage figures have remained about the same as before over the last couple of years.

The biggest change has occurred precisely in terms of the world peace outlook and, secondly, of unemployment. In September-October 1979 22 percent of the respondents cited unemployment as the subject of primary concern. At that time only 9 percent of them regarded world peace as a matter of primary concern.

Poll participants were also asked whether there had been recent developments that have endangered or are endangering peace between the big powers. This question was answered affirmatively by 67 percent and negatively by 15 percent. Eighteen percent of the respondents had no opinion on this question.

World rearmament was regarded as the biggest threat to world peace by 24 percent of the respondents. The second biggest threat was felt to be the change in American political policy (14 percent of the respondents) and events in the Near East (12 percent). The next to be cited were the Afghanistan situation (10 percent) and the worsening of relations between the major powers (10 percent), the Polish situation (8 percent) and the growing threat of a general war (8 percent).

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BRIEFS

RADIO'S SOVIET TREATMENT DEFENDED—The Newspaper Association's organ, SUOMEN LEHDISTO, has asked press representatives whether only bad news is news. Olli Kivinen, the head of the HELSINGIN SANOMAT Foreign Department, disputes claims that there is a preponderance of "bad news." As a counterargument he gave an example of where the relating of "good news" can lead to. The picture of the Soviet Union painted by Moscow correspondents chosen on the basis of programs like the Finnish Broadcasting Corporation's "Neighbor's Quarter [7Hour]" and membership in the Communist Party, which is smoother than the image conveyed by PRAVDA or IZVESTIA, produces just the opposite effect of the one its creators hope to achieve. Tens and hundreds of thousands of Finns visit the Soviet Union and see that things are no more purely roses and lavender water there than in any other country. In giving another picture of the situation, the Finnish Broadcasting Corporation loses its credibility in the matter. Listeners and viewers do not believe reports about those things that really are good in the Soviet Union either. Gilding the lily does it a disservice. Unvarnished reporting of the facts is such an essential part of the reporting of news in the West that deviating from it creates an unbelievable picture. [Text] [Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 7 Apr 81 p 9] 11466

CSO: 3107/74

GIRAUD EXPLAINS, DEFENDS NATION'S INDUSTRIAL POLICY

Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE in French 30 Mar 81 pp 48-49

[Interview with Andre Giraud, minister of industry, by Gilles Coville, Jacques Barraux, and Olivier Drouin]

"Industrial decisions should be made within the companies themselves." Frequently suspected of leaning towards a system of state control, Mr Andre Giraud, minister of industry, strongly denies it. With the very notable exception of the steel industry where the government had to stave off bankruptcy, industrial policy consists primarily in providing stimulus and incentive. For the rest, it's up to industry to show its mettle.

[Question] In the public's eyes, you are much more the minister of energy than the minister of industry. Do you have the means to conduct a true industrial policy?

[Answer] The basic energy policy instruments--excepting prices--are in the hands of the minister of industry. Whether watching over government enterprises (a critical role in this area), developing energy sources, or dealing with supply policy or action on oil, nuclear, coal or solar technologies, we hold specialized discussions with other countries. The government's action therefore appears very clear.

The situation is different in the area of industrial policy, where government action is naturally more diluted. Financial questions, specifically, are part of economic policy; moreover, since we have a liberal administration, the basic rule is not to substitute government offices for industry's corporate offices.

In a system such as ours, the government's role must be confined to determining the general framework within which business operates. This is an essential role, but one that is partly invisible to the public.

[Question] You call yourself liberal, but are readily suspected of leaning towards a system of state control.

[Answer] The debate between liberal politics and a state-planned system is a false debate. Actually, the only problem is finding a balance between expression of the government's will, considered in its general lines, and the freedom of business in its everyday affairs.

I object to state planning when it means replacing the responsibility of corporate leaders by government. I say that the final decisions in industry must be made

within the companies themselves. You could not cite a single example of reorganization of an industry since 1978 in which the ministry of industry made the final decision or did anything more than sometimes giving advice--barring the steel industry, which is a completely separate case.

I also object to annoying interventionism, which unfortunately is deeply rooted in our traditions. For the past 3 years, I have relentlessly hunted down needless regulations. I hope that I have narrowed the field of government meddling.

However, this concern to leave industrialists free to play their role does not relieve the government of its responsibility--far from it. It sets up the general framework--economic, fiscal and social policies, and various incentives to favor a certain trend. Laisser-faire does not exist. The government must know, say and do what it wants. The restructuring of the ministry in 1979 was designed to create a new type of dialogue between the government and the business sector.

[Question] What was this reform all about?

[Answer] After reclassifying the various offices of the former Mining Department involved with energy and raw materials, we acted in three directions.

[First,] we strengthened instruments for forecasting and obtaining information on the industrial situation. The Directorate General of Industry, created by Mr Michel d'Ornano in 1974, is at the head of the main sectoral divisions, which are now led by men from the world of industry. What was needed was to give it a solid "instrument panel," to endow it with a business spirit, and to enable it to make better use of our think tank, the Research and Forecasting Center. The Ministry of Industry is not a powerful agency. We meant it to stay that way, but be given the means to act with the same intellectual weapons that the other agencies have.

[Second,] we renovated the aids to innovation. A delegation was put in charge of innovation policy. The ANVAR [National Agency for the Valorization of Research] was completely rebuilt and given increased power. Our success with companies of all sizes and in all regions has gone beyond our hopes.

[Third,] we set up regional structures to assist companies. Seventeen interdepartmental industrial offices replace the former mining offices. They are not there to enforce niggling regulations. They are there to have contact with and respond to the expectations of businessmen.

[Question] Traditionally the most important industrial policy decisions in France have been made on the Rue de Rivoli. Do you think that, since the restructuring of the Ministry of Industry, your agency is now in a better position, in comparison with the finance agency?

[Answer] It is not a question of preeminence. The geography of government is irrelevant! Only the final result is important. Is or isn't the government successful in encouraging its industries? Does or doesn't the government's economic policy reflect industrial strategy requirements?

Ministry of Industry representatives are trying to think like corporate leaders within the government complex, where this is not the usual reflex.

[Question] What have been your policy constants over the past few years?

[Answer] The industrial strategy we advocate has developed around three ideas.

There is a need to encourage the French people's spirit of initiative and innovation. The administrative simplifications and structural reform are part of this effort. The most striking examples of it are the price liberalization policy and the ANVAR aids.

Next we need to help traditional industries modernize. The government cannot remain passive in light of the traumas affecting part of French industry. We had to save the two leading heavy steel manufacturers from bankruptcy in 1978. Massive government intervention was inevitable. Today, we cannot remain indifferent to the difficulties facing sectors threatened by world competition, such as the textile industry.

The major traditional industries have also been weakened by the sudden hardening of the international market. The automobile, machine tool and chemical industries will have to adapt at great speed. We must help them in their effects to resume the offensive.

Finally, we must encourage French companies to conquer shares of the world market in industries of the future. France has considerable advantages in this area, strengthened by its specialized institutions such as the Energy Savings Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, the National Space Research Center, CNEXO [National Center for Ocean Exploitation] and the Solar Energy Commission, In this area, of course, the government is directly implementing industrial policy. But without NASA, would there be an American space industry?

Some of these activities are considered as really new, although they are already "mature." The nuclear industry already employs more workers than the steel industry, and our country has complete mastery over the technology. The computer (hardware and software), aeronautics, space, telecommunications and agrofood sectors are also very important branches of French industry. Industrial groups have good control over their development.

But it is also the government's responsibility to make sure that our country is a participant in the main "strategic" revolutions affecting industry. These can lead either to the creation of major new industries, which tomorrow will occupy the place the automobile industry does today, or to the complete transformation of some of today's industries, by the introduction of automation or biotechnology, for instance.

[Question] These high technology activities are essentially supposed to benefit from the largesse of CODIS [Committee for the Orientation and Development of Strategic Industries]. Aren't you, however, disappointed by the initial results of this agency?

[Answer] CODIS was established in 1979. This is an interministerial body, headed by the prime minister, in which the Directorate General of Industry plays a more or less instructive role. This committee was not endowed with its own means. Thus it acts through various agencies. It is still too soon to pass judgment on its effectiveness.

First, a list of "strategic" industries had to be drawn up. This is an open-ended list, which now covers seven sectors.

The actual market studies had to be conducted to determine who was to benefit within these seven sectors. Now they are at the stage of evaluating the qualifications of the applicants, some of whom have already been selected.

[Question] We still have not seen what we have all been waiting for, namely, a government program to strengthen industry.

[Answer] The recovery measures taken between the two oil crises and the impact of the government's measures to promote industrial investment should not be underestimated. The strategy thus defined and the progress made in terms of the aggressiveness and management of French industry will undoubtedly now make it possible to go further, general economic policy permitting.

[Question] What do you think of management in France?

[Answer] I am impressed by the progress made in ten years. Whether referring to government enterprises, the large private firms or small and medium-sized industries, it seems to me that management has been considerably improved. There has been a surprising reform of the industrial fiber. In addition, however, or perhaps above all, companies are looking further, both geographically and into the future. Their leaders are defining objectives and sticking to them. That gives reason for enough optimism, even in a difficult situation, to warrant a redoubling of efforts and success.

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PROFILE ON CP SECRETARY GENERAL PUBLISHED

Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 15 Mar 81 p 8

[Interview with Secretary General of the KKE Central Committee Kharilaos Florakis by Giorgos Leondaritis]

[Text] We will speak candidly: I did not think it would be easy to approach the secretary general of the KKE Central Committee. Even more, I thought that he would not agree to talk to a newspaper which has a completely different orientation from that which speaks for his party. And, perhaps since the nature of the interview was not political, this meeting would not interest him.

So I was pleasantly surprised when I heard his voice on the telephone say to me "Can you come to my house at 1730 this afternoon?" I hurried to assure him that I could see him whenever he wished. "So, at 1730." At the appointed hour I was outside of the house with the brown windows and small garden on 6 Pythias Street in Khalandri. The doors and windows were all shut. No noise was heard. As I rang the doorbell, I thought perhaps something had happened to him, or maybe he had changed his mind. But none of these had happened. My fears dissolved when he opened the door, greeted me with a warm smile and shook my hand. "I am happy to meet you...Come sit in my office where we can talk in peace...."

Tall, solid, with curly white hair and a blond moustache, Kharilaos Florakis' presence fills the small room. Dressed casually in a dark blue flannel shirt, he shows us to the armchairs in front of his desk and warns us about the carved sofa opposite. "Do not sit there because it does not support weight. It is a wonderful antique, a very beautiful piece of furniture, one of those which does not exist anymore, but it does not support a lot of weight." On his wooden carved desk is a complete collection of pipes, the afternoon newspapers, a pair of glasses for farsightedness, books and papers. While he talks, he smokes his pipe which burns out easily and he relights it with his lighter.

"You and Papandreou do not part with the pipe...."

"Andreas also smokes cigarettes. I once did...I began to smoke cigarettes at 16. But when I suffered from asthma, my doctor forbid it. So I ended up with the pipe and I have gotten used to it...."

The aromatic smoke is pleasant in the room. Several packs of a Dutch brand of tobacco are on an old piece of furniture. Fortunately, my friends bring me tobacco from abroad since it has become very expensive on the market here, he tells me.

I look around: a multicolored portrait of Lenin on the wall, a bookcase, a small television, and photographs on the walls where the KKE secretary general is pictured with Leonid Brezhnev, with a cap on a boat, older snapshots of his friends and family and a photograph of his wife in a nurse's uniform.

The former major-general of "Democratic Army" now spends a quiet life devoted to his party and politics. Beyond the narrow frameworks of party work, which covers, however, 24 hours, there is no time for anything else.

A Full 24 Hours

Florakis always wakes up at 0640. After dressing, he eats breakfast and at 0700 his first job is to read RIZOSPASTIS. At 0730, he leaves for the party offices on Kapodistriou Street. The party has given him a car. Until 0900 he reads the morning newspapers. He reads them all down to the last line and he is always very well informed on domestic and foreign matters. After 0900 he begins contacts and conferences with the members of the Politburo and the Central Committee. On certain days he receives those who wish to see him on whatever matter.

At noon he returns to his house in Khalandri. "My midday rest is indispensable. If I do not lie down for even half-an-hour, I am not able to work for the rest of the day." In the afternoon he is usually at the Chamber of Deputies. Not always, however.... "I am not one of the regulars," he says with frankness and he hastens to add that he absolutely respects the Chamber and his party considers the Chamber's role essential for the functioning of the Republic. But he is forced to be absent sometimes because "many sessions are only for up-dating. I do not have the rights of other leaders because of the regulations in force at this moment. So I am limited to following the mediations of parliamentary representatives from the various parties...."

In the evening, when Florakis is not invited to some special event or embassy reception, he stays at home and usually he manages to watch the latest news. He shows me the small television next to him and a "video" machine. "It is a gift from my brother. I have an older brother." The brother of the KKE secretary general, Lambros Florakis, a former judge and now a lawyer, lives in Athens but is not actively involved in politics. "Since we were children, I have taken from him whatever he did not need, as usually happens with boys who have older brothers! So even now, when he got a color television, he gave me the black and white television and the video...."

The diversions of the KKE leader are limited: "Yes, I like the theater. The cinema rarely shows good works. Recently I have seen Tzimas' 'Man With the Carnation'. It was a beautiful piece of work and correct from an historical viewpoint. But I do not often manage to attend shows...." He remains a bit thoughtful. "Do not forget that for so many years we had become accustomed to illegal work and such things were unknown to us. We did not have the freedom for such luxuries. Now that our party has become legal, we are beginning to adapt ourselves to a new life...."

Does Florakis have a hobby, human weaknesses or preferences? No. He is a simple "every-day man." He does not have preferences or idiosyncrasies even in his choice of food. "I am rather frugal in my eating," he says and adds with his broad smile, "Since people see me so heavily built they think I eat a lot. The opposite is true. Besides, you know, in my life I had no possibilities of becoming a gourmet...."

Childhood Years

Question: Let us talk a little about your life. The world knows you as a leader of KKE, as a man active in the civil war, and nothing else. What is your "unknown life?"

Our fellow talker relights his pipe and watches the smoke rings as if to see uncoiled within his whole stormy life. "My childhood years have remained sharp in my memory. I was born in Rakhoula near Agrafa in the province of Karditsa. 'Mania' kept me there until the age of 10. You know what 'mania' means? The grandmother. So we called her. I remember the stories she told me about the years of the Turkish rule. I must confess to you that I am homesick for those years...the village, the poor people, the Christmases which we children awaited with eagerness. 'Mania' dressed me in 'zgaronia'. Do you know what 'zgaronia' were? Shoes made of goat hair so as to not stick in the snow. What a beautiful season! We peeped, as if bewitched, at the shepherds with the goatskins who daubed their faces with charcoal and played the Christmas sprites. I remember still the soldiers who returned from Asia Minor; we heard then narrating their personal adventures from the front...."

And your first contact with the Labor Movement?

"Yes. This childhood remembrance has remained alive within me. When I lived in Karditsa, our house was near the Labor Center. There I saw assembled the tobacco workers. Every evening they gathered and sang. As I returned from school--at that time we went to school in the morning and afternoon--I stood outside the Labor Center door and I heard the songs and their conversations. I think that I then felt the first revolutionary stirrings...."

When Kharilaos Florakis was small, as he confessed, he dreamed of becoming an... aviator! He did not, but from a very young age, despite the fact that his family was very well-off, he was concerned about social contrasts. He was about 14 years old when he became a member of the "Pioneers" as the communist youth was then called.

In the Underground

The meetings of the farmers, the peasants who came down with black flags from the mountains to get five okes of corn, influenced him deeply. In 1931 he went to the TTT [Posts, Telegraph and Telephone] school and emerged a telegraph operator. The occupation found him there and he was immediately called up. They sent him to the SEK [Greek State Railways] lines service. He was detained when the Italians came. "The administrator of the Security Branch was a certain Nikopoulos. But he did not hand us over to the Italians. If he had handed us over, we would not be alive today. Later a document was sent to the Italian commander by the Ministry of Communications which said that I was a leader of the strike movement against the...occupation troops and the Greek government of that time. I have kept a copy of that document. Based on it, the Italians came to arrest me, but in the meantime I had gone underground...."

Kharilaos Florakis has been more well-known since the Second Rebellion when he was a major-general in the "Democratic Army". Throughout the occupation and afterwards, in the period 1946 to 1949, he used the pseudonym "Giotis".

Captain Giotis?

"No. I was not a captain. The title of captain existed in ELAS [National People's Liberation Army], not in 'Democratic Army'. But our adversaries stuck on those of us who had a pseudonym the title 'captain'. Certainly, it does not at all debase me since the title 'captain' has an honorable tradition since the years of the Turkish rule. But I simply point out that I did not have this title. I was an administrator in DSE [Democratic Army of Greece] and I had a political deputy, Nikos Belogiannis...."

Magdalini Floraki who came in at that moment with a fruit jam and liqueur interrupts the discussion. The wife of the KKE secretary general is a beautiful, polite woman who detests publicity more than anything else. She prefers to live modestly near the man whom she has known and loved in very difficult moments.

Few know that on the margin of Florakis' revolutionary activity in the period of the dictatorship, a romance which sealed his life developed. He was in the prisoners' hospital "Agios Pavlos" in the "Averof" prisons with an obstruction and Magda was serving there as a Greek Red Cross nurse. She looked after him and helped him overcome many difficulties. At the same time, she served all the prisoners by sending out notes and bringing others into them secretly.

"I realized that her interest in me was real because at that time I was not first secretary but a simple member, a prisoner with an unsure 'tomorrow' and my life was in danger. So we decided to get married...."

The rumor has circulated that your wife is American....

He looks at me astonished. Then he bursts into loud laughter. "What? An American? Magda American? Do not let her hear you, she will kill you! She is a genuine Cretan...." He laughs again and adds: "In 1951 she married an American soldier. After a year of living together, her husband died. She received a pension from him. But there was an unjustified fuss over the matter, so they cut off her pension...."

With the "509"

Kharilaos Florakis' whole life has been adventurous--struggles, arrests, pursuits, prisons, exiles. He remembers when he had illegally come to Greece in 1954: "I was arrested on 27 July, Agios Pandeleimon day, near...Agios Pandeleimon. For three months I remained in strict isolation. Afterwards, they took me to the Kerkyra prisons. I was tried for violation of Law 509. I remained in custody for six years. Finally my trial took place in 1960.

"Among the defense lawyers was Kostas Stefanakis who in his truly memorable speech proved the unconstitutionality of laws 375 and 509. In fact, the president of the military court was so impressed by his speech that, addressing the deputies-lawyers, he said: 'Call at last in the Chamber for this law to be repealed and for us to calm down....' Despite this, the law was maintained...."

With the 21 April coup d'etat, Kharilaos Florakis was immediately arrested in the house where he lived then, on Akharnon Street. They took him to the Hippodrome, then to Gioura and then to Partheni on Leros. "There they threw us in a storehouse

which had existed since the time of the Italian occupation. There were 500 of us within the same area. Most suffered since they were accustomed from other exiles to having their own tent or room. But for us who had spent months in isolation and in cells, this was...a game."

The Sincere Ones

After Leros, Kharilaos Florakis was transfered to Oropos. They let him go free in 1972. But he was obligated to present himself every morning to Security. One day he did not go. They searched for him in vain. Florakis had secretly fled abroad. He returned in 1974 at the fall of the dictatorship.

How does the KKE leader view his opponents? I phrase my question somewhat...unorthodoxically: Of your political opponents, whom do you most respect?

He is at a loss: "How do I respect them? My acquaintence with the bourgeios politicians is small. I have not worked with them. At any rate, I respect those who are sincere, those who show 'frankness' to us...." He did not name names, but certain incidents make us believe that among these he includes Premier Georgios Rallis.

The time which we had at our disposal was up. One last question: Have you read any books lately? He laughs: "The titles and the prologues! Beyond that, I only skim them. I feel the need for a book as intellectual food. But I do not manage to read them. You see, 24 hours cannot become 36 hours! My day is overloaded and there is no time. The only solution is simply for one to take care to organize his work as best he can...."

We have reached the garden exit. The afternoon is at its most melancholy hour. Florakis shows us the small garden: "Here I somehow have the feelings of the countryside which is so often missing for us." With these words we exchange the last handshake.

Night of the Earthquake

How did Kharilaos Florakis confront the recent earthquakes?

He tells me: "When the great earthquake occurred, I was away. My wife, Magda, was alone. But she is a brave woman. Everything shook, various things fell down, but we did not suffer damages. This house--it is my wife's--is strong and it stood. When I returned, I found many neighbors who live in neighboring apartment houses gathered in the drawing room. Ours is a single family home and they considered it safe. So that night we had many...guests. My thoughts, however, ran continually to those who were hurt by the fury of Enceladus, those who lost their homes, who live in tents, who mourn, who wait...."

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CSO: 4908

NORDIC SOCIAL DEMOCRATS AUTHOR BOOK ON SECURITY POLICY

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 3 Mar 81 p 2

[Article by "cb": "Socialists Say Bigger Defense Expenditures Might Weaken Support for NATO"]

[Text] The desire to retain the existing balance in society constitutes a part of the background for the fact that the Social Democratic Party cannot be a party to suddenly raising defense expenditures by 3 percent, as the NATO countries agreed in principle to do. If one does that, it could bring about a change in the population's attitude toward defense and NATO, and the Social Democratic Party does not want such a change to take place.

That is how member of the Folketing Lasse Budtz, who is the chairman of the Social Democratic Party's defense and foreign policy committee, explains his party's proposal of a "zero solution" in a new compromise on defense. Lasse Budtz gives that explanation in "Udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik i Norden" [Foreign Policy and Security Policy in the Northern Countries], a book which has just been published. The book also contains contributions by four other Nordic Social Democrats. In the book, which was presented at a press conference at Christiansborg yesterday, Lasse Budtz says that there is overwhelming endorsement of NATO in Denmark and that the Danish people have followed the Soviet military build-up in the Baltic Sea area with "keen attention." He notes that Soviet maneuvers in the "Sea of Peace," as the Soviets like to call the Baltic Sea, now have moved so close to Denmark that they cannot get any closer.

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BRIEFS

AUSTRIANS OFFERED VINKA AIRPLANE--Otto Rosch, Austrian Secretary of Defense, on an official visit to our country, visited Lapland's flight detachment in Rovaniemi on Wednesday and the brigade of light infantry in Sodankyla. In Rovaniemi Secretary Rosch was shown, among other things, a Finnish Vinka airplane. Sales offer for the airplane was presented to Austrian officials on Wednesday. In addition to Vinka, Lapland's flight detachment demonstrated Draken planes and Fouga destroyers as well as other equipment. In the Sodankyla brigade of light infantry, Secretary Rosch with his party saw, among other things, the newest equipment of the defensive forces during the demonstration. [Text] [Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 26 March 81 p 6] 9677

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CIVIL DEFENSE CHIEF: COUNTRY LACKS SHELTER SPACE FOR 1.9 MILLION

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 2 Mar 81 p 2

[Article]

[Text] "If war breaks out tomorrow, shelter space for 1.9 million people will be lacking in the country as a whole. But here in Civil Defense there is a positive attitude where the possibility of broad political support for our work is concerned," says the head of the Civil Defense Administration, Erik Schultz.

In 1950, a law was passed which calls for the establishment of shelter spaces under all newly-built residential structures with space for more than two families and all commercial buildings for more than 10 occupants. Since then, more and more shelter space has been added, and at present we have shelter space for a total of 2.9 million people. Most of the space referred to is private shelter space, but there also is combined public shelter space which is used for parking in peacetime, for example, and finally there are also the well-known underground bunkers.

Schultz believes that these bunkers are not out-of-date in a period when there are nuclear weapons.

"They are safe if the bomb falls at a distance from the bunker, but there is nothing we can do in the case of a direct hit. And one must admit that the theoretically-calculated direct-hit area for nuclear bombs is pretty big." Regarding the question of what the population should do about the lack of shelter space for almost two million people if a critical situation arises, the chief of the Civil Defense Administration would like to distinguish between long-term and short-term considerations:

"Over the long term," he says, "we naturally must build more shelter space. And in that regard I am happy that there is strong political backing for civil defense work in the government and in wide circles within the Folketing, and that support was intensified recently at the first reading of the law concerning Civil Defense's future work on 15 January. Over the short term, one can make use of particularly stable cellars which offer a good chance of being converted into emergency shelters. Wartime experience in Germany indicated that was possible. We put out 200,000 booklets with instructions for performing that conversion in 1962, and since those instructions are still valid we can reprint them with lightning quickness and distribute them again."

A Gloomy Business

Two slop pails, four water bottles, some candles and a hand-operated fan--that is the equipment in each shelter space. Such a space is called a room for passersby. If war comes, 50 inhabitants of Copenhagen are to exist on 34 square meters under the Orstedspark. There are similar spaces at 1,000 other locations in the city. They all have in common the fact that it will be a matter of getting close together and using sparingly the two liters of water each individual will have as long as the war lasts.

The space is surrounded by concrete on all sides and is dome-shaped. In the middle of the ceiling, there is a steel hatch. That is the emergency exit. The area feels cold and clammy, but people will not freeze when all 50 of them are there. The 0.76 square meter each person has will probably be filled to the last square centimeter, and if one has difficulty in breathing one can turn the handle of the fan. The sand filter can be assumed to have taken care of radioactivity.

After all, it is more exciting in Civil Defense's "flagship," which is the big shelter space under Israels Plads. "Approximately 1,000 people can live here for months at a time," says Civil Engineer V. Ronne, who is responsible for maintaining the shelter spaces.

Steps echo in the big rectangular space, which most of all resembles a hangar for aircraft, as we inspect it. Civil Defense obviously does not expect war to come soon. Two parked automobiles and large oil stains on the floor bear witness to the fact that the space is used as a garage. Large control panels are fastened to the walls. They control electric supply for the area. There also should be enough water. The space has an independent conduit for that purpose.

But 1,000 people! There is plenty of space, but the thought of the atmosphere in that space when the enormous concrete door slams shut behind the last to arrive can certainly be frightening, and yet one will be quite fortunate to be among the 1,000 for approximately half of the population of Copenhagen has nowhere at all to go.

There is only room for approximately 13,000 people in the "combined space" to which the parking garage belongs. Approximately 50,000 people can be in the room for passersby. Approximately 284,000 people can be in the shelter spaces under apartment houses and commercial buildings if the spaces are ready in other respects--it takes from a few days to 2 months to make them usable as shelter spaces. That makes space for a total of 347,000 people in all. That is enough--calculating roughly--for half of us.

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CIVIL DEFENSE BEGINS CAMPAIGN TO INFORM PUBLIC OF WORK

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 4 Mar 81 p 14

[Article by Kirsten Risgaard: "If War Comes, Civil Defense Can Help, But It Will Cost Money"]

[Text] A few people support the demand for effective civil defense, but most people close their eyes, thinking "it won't happen to us." They do not think there is any danger or they believe that if something happens it will be so serious that anything at all would be hopeless--even Civil Defense's efforts."

That is how Erik Schultz, the director of Civil Defense, describes the Danes' concept of Civil Defense, which has been the subject of a running debate since it was revealed how poorly the civil population would be aided if a war situation arose. When the Korean War began in 1950, the Armed Forces were allocated an extra 50 million kroner all at one time. That would be the equivalent of 400 million kroner today. But the Civil Defense budget has actually been cut in two since 1965. Whereas defense costs more than 8 billion kroner annually, the amount allotted to civil defense is 252 million kroner. In 1979, Denmark used 1,347 kroner per inhabitant for expenditures for defense while the macunt used for civil defense purposes was 50 kroner per inhabitant.

But are we in this country adequately informed concerning what civil defense actually amounts to? It is a well-known fact that many people only shrug their shoulders at the sight of the well-uniformed Civil Defense personnel, think they are some sort of conscientious objectors and call them snake charmers because they often are involved in fighting big fires in peacetime.

In peacetime, the corps has a headquarters in Copenhagen. There are Civil Defense barracks at seven locations around the country: Thisted, Herning, Haderslev, Middelfart, Hillerod, Naestved and Allinge. The Civil Defense ambulance school is in Naestved. Training for officers and noncommissioned officers of the Civil Defense corps is given at Bernstorffs Slot in Copenhagen and the platoon commanders' school is located in Herning.

The compulsory service lasting 8 months is performed by 1,200 men at a time. Some of them leave for the local Civil Defense sections after a month of basic training, undertaking to put in 100 duty hours and take additional training within a period of 2 years.

John Hansen, a 25-year-old primary-school teacher in Copenhagen, says, "I would be pleased with the training for civil defense work, in particular, if the public only knew something about the possibilities in advance. It is impossible to take money out of the budget for defense. In my opinion, there is more human value in civil defense than in the military service."

Erik Albrechtslund, from Aarhus, who is a 22-year-old qualified butcher, says, "I have noticed, here, how one can live well when people cooperate with one another. I am interested in saving human lives, and I think that many young unemployed people would benefit from Civil Defense training. There would also be more people in the population who understood that civil defense is vital at a time when there is war in many places."

Niels Poulsen, a 30-year-old biologist who is the oldest in the group, says, "It would have been absurd for me to go into the Army. What is lacking is simply information for the population. I think that not only the top leadership of Civil Defense but also the responsible persons in the respective municipalities should demand the truth from the government regarding the civilian population's chances. What good is a defense system costing billions if the civilian population cannot be helped? Have you sold us out in advance, not even giving us a chance of survival?"

Randers--A Model Civil Defense Town

Randers municipality is one of the places in this country where great things are taking place in civil defense. Civil defense leader P. H. Frisch, who has had 9 years of service in the Armed Forces, does not think there will be nuclear war in Denmark. "An enemy will not destroy anything more than is necessary to obtain his ends," he says.

The town has had large-scale exercises which were intended to keep up the civil defense training and give the population an idea of what can be accomplished. It was assumed that the northern part of the town had been bombed. One hundred seventy-five people were evacuated to Mariager and 300 Civil Defense people extinguished fires, delivered emergency rations and rescued injured persons from houses which had collapsed. Well-trained bloodhounds were also used. It is calculated that Civil Defense has 72 hours within which to carry out its lifesaving activities in cases involving serious bomb damage. A Swedish analysis indicates that 2.8 percent of the seriously injured die every hour, so such a situation requires intensive efforts.

In many Danish towns, the people whose mission it is to provide assistance rush around in a bewildered state because they do not have a complete analysis of the town. Civil Defense in Randers has such an analysis. There they know how each house is arranged and how severely it can be damaged if an accident occurs. They also know where people are located at various times during the day and night. Another analysis indicates that every citizen of Randers can get into a protective area in 3 minutes. So there is space for everybody there--even for people from single-family houses to whom the law requiring shelter space does not apply. In Switzerland, for example, there is shelter space in each individual house.

Civil Defense would like to reach a mobilization strength of 106,000 men. The present requirement, calculated according to the Armed Forces' effectiveness requirement, is considered to be a good 84,000 men, but what they have is 61,675 men.

Volunteers

The local Civil Defense sections have more than 12,000 people at their disposal. Among the Civil Defense volunteers are many women, trained in the same way as the men. Civil Defense constitutes a part of Denmark's total Armed Forces along with the military, the civilian reserve units and the police. In wartime, the mission of the Civil Defense corps is to perform emergency services and other civil defense tasks of any kind, in cooperation with any local forces which may be available, within areas hit by war damage on a large scale, and to provide assistance in areas where the damage is limited.

In peacetime, Civil Defense forces are used to provide assistance in case of accidents or natural catastrophes. In Herning, as in the other Civil Defense barracks in Denmark, a force is always on duty which can go to the scene of a railroad accident in a matter of minutes and provide assistance under chaotic conditions caused by snow, oil pollution, explosions or extensive fires.

In a discussion of the effectiveness and the shortcomings of Civil Defense among three draftees, a noncommissioned officer and the leader of the unit at the Civil Defense barracks in Herning, Civil Defense commander Kaj Duch said: "I think the worst thing is the fact that the population has no defense against chemical warfare if it should be waged. Among other things, it is our mission in Civil Defense to detect, mark and decontaminate nuclear fallout and chemical warfare agents. We have protective clothing, filter masks and antidotes. In this country, we calculate that we have shelter space for half of the population, but in case of a sudden attack with nerve gas, not everybody will be able to reach the protective spaces. The gas affects the nervous system in such a way that one dies if the antidote, atropine, is not injected within 2 minutes.

"There are many questions which should be asked of the civilian population," he said. "For instance, why do you not demand that you can be given notice of the presence of gas? That everybody has shelter space? That you have knowledge of what essential rations will be there and that filters are located in the ventilation system for the shelter spaces? I know how I will protect my family with a protective space in the cellar."

Training

The drafted Civil Defense personnel are a segment of young people like those in the Armed Forces. The atmosphere in a Civil Defense barracks is relaxed and comradely, and it is claimed that training in private life is on a higher level than in the military.

Unit leader H. Kolborg says, "Civil Defense training is good and many-sided. What Civil Defense has is good, but the question is whether we have enough. What I mean, of course, is that every Dane should be able to obtain a space in an effective shelter. We should get out-of-date medicine replaced and other things brought in. But that will only happen if the people themselves demand it."

Denmark in the Danger Zone

P. H. Frisch thinks that the preparation of individual communal plans for civil defense protection of Danish towns is needed. For example, Randers and Esbjerg are vulnerable in different ways. P. H. Frisch also thinks that Danish civil defense is doing so poorly because it is politically innocuous. "Chatter about teaching in the schools, tax rates, unemployment and social conditions produces large-scale debates and political awareness, but not very many Danes know anything about civil defense. Politicians do not get into trouble because they cut back on civil defense. Perhaps they think that if war comes they themselves will be removed by the enemy--or that they simply will not survive--and so there just won't be any citizens to bring charges against them for having let the population down," he says.

The Civil Defense Administration has delivered a comprehensive memorandum on Danish civil defense and civil preparedness in the 1980's to the Ministry of the Interior.

The Director of Civil Defense, Trik Schultz, says: "Strategically, Denmark is in a damned bad location--in the danger zone at the entrance to the Baltic Sea and with a chance of being invaded if the enemy enters Germany. We delivered the admonitory memorandum because we do not want to continue our present course. I am not washing my hands of the affair, but am saying to the politicians: 'It is your concern to see to it that the population is protected by an effective civil defense system. If our appeal helps, we have acted as we intended, but if the acute situation drifts off into the usual political debates, with further cutbacks as a consequence, the population will have gotten what it deserves, for the population itself does not choose to act.'"

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ARMED FORCES CHIEF WARNS OF 'ZERO-SOLUTION' RESULTS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 10 Mar 81 p 2

[Article by Chr. Brondum: "Armed Forces Chief Warns Against Government's Defense Proposal Again"]

[Text] Just as the Social Democratic Folketing group is getting ready to take a stand today on the government's proposal with respect to new defense negotiations, the chief of the Armed Forces, General Knud Jorgensen, gave warning once again against the consequences of a so-called "zero solution" on defense.

At the same time, the chief of the Armed Forces called attention to Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen's promise at a NATO summit meeting in 1978 that he would try to obtain an increase of 3 percent at fixed prices for defense expenditures.

The warnings and reminders by the chief of the Armed Forces occurred at a meeting of the Dansk Samvirke organization at Christiansborg yesterday evening. In regard to the government's promise to NATO, the chief of the Armed Forces said "Denmark postponed fulfillment of its promise until 1981, but the prime minister stated in the Folketing immediately afterward that the objective would be to play an important role in the coming defense system." The general also called attention to the fact that the NATO defense ministers confirmed their goal as recently as December 1980.

In regard to the consequences of a "zero solution," the chief of the Armed Forces said they would entail a reduction of the Armed Forces' operational strength by one-third in peacetime. Personnel strength is being reduced by a little less than 4,000 men per municipality, so that there now will be a little less than 40,000 men per municipality in the Armed Forces by comparison with 65,000 in 1960. Because of the necessary strict assigning of priorities which this entails, the ground defenses of Sjaelland will be considerably weakened, and defense will become a political plaything. That has always been an advantage only for its opponents. Confidence in Danish solidarity in its relationship with NATO will be further weakened, and Sweden, Norway and West Germany will have to re-evaluate their defense commitments, the chief of the Armed Forces said. The Social Democratic Folketing group has the government's proposal concerning a new defense plan today and will discuss it in an expanded group meeting. The plan is expected--for reasons having to do with employment, among other things--to include an

increase in the defense budget of close to 1 percent. In that connection, several leading Social Democrats have stated, in reference to the group's left wing, that it could be accepted if three or four members of the group would not support such a defense compromise. Yesterday, in an all-day meeting, the group studied the security policy situation, listening to lectures by outside experts.

Defense Minister Poul Sogaard and the Radical Liberal Party are expected to convene the parties to the existing agreement on defense for new discussions in the course of the current week.

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SDP FOLKETING GROUP WORKS TO MAINTAIN DEFENSE CUTS

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 11 Mar 81 p 1

[Article by "fly": "Social Democratic Opposition to the Government's Defense Proposal"]

[Text] Several Social Democratic members of the Folketing rejected the proposal for a future defense plan which the government presented to the party's Folketing group yesterday. The proposal includes a moderate increase in the defense budget in proportion to the existing economic framework. In presenting this proposal the government actually has abandoned its original point of departure--that is, the so-called "zero solution," which was equivalent to an unaltered financial figure at fixed prices, but with a favorable adjustment of wage and price increases.

When Minister of Defense Poul Sogaard presented the proposal at the group meeting on Tuesday, several members of the Folketing group decleared that they could not support it. Their opposition was worded in various ways. While some dissociated themselves from it pointedly, others confined themselves to "having reservations" about it.

The members of the group who dissociated themselves unambiguously were Jytte Hilden, Christian Kelm-Hansen, Kaj Poulsen, Mette Groes and Helle Degn. They all stated that they supported the government's original position, the "zero solution." Furthermore, Lissa Mathiassen stated that she opposes increasing the defense budget. However, she was prevented from participating in the group meeting. Finally, Soren Norgaard Sorensen and Kirsten Andersen indicated that they had reservations regarding the government's proposal.

Other Social Democratic members of the Folketing are hesitant. They do not want to take a final position until they know more details and have full information about the proposal, which is described as "vague and incomplete" by a number of people. Inge Fischer Moller, who is one of the two deputy chairmen of the Social Democratic Party, managed to arrange, at the group meeting, that the minister of defense would always keep the Folketing group oriented on the adjustments made in the proposal in all phases of the negotiations.

Agreement Arrived at at the Congress

Inge Fischer Moller stated earlier that the "zero solution" should be retained as the government's basis for negotiations. Now he has told INFORMATION: "I want

the government to come as close to a 'zero solution' as is at all possible.' Does that mean that the minister of defense has a very narrow mandate for negotiation?" he was asked.

"Yes, it should be understood in that way. It is important to remember the agreement arrived at at our congress last year, which stated clearly that no more should be given for defense, and it is important that we should not do anything which can be taken to mean that we are going back on that agreement. On the other hand, regard for some places where defense work is being done signifies that we must yield a little more than we originally had thought of doing," says Inge Fischer Moller. One of the most energetic spokesmen for retaining the "zero solution," Jytte Hilden, told INFORMATION that, in her opinion, the "zero solution" has been given up, and therefore she cannot support the revised proposal. "I am satisfied that many of the members of my party in the group now definitely share my views," she says.

It was not possible to obtain a comment from Preben Steen Nielsen, the Social Democratic defense spokesman, yesterday. At the press conference after the ministers' meeting on Tuesday, Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen said that there no longer is a possibility of "an absolute zero solution."

"Will you designate a percentage?" he was asked.

"No. It has been said many times that talking about percentages for defense does not make any sense, so I will also refrain from doing so from now on."

The prime minister added that the original, "absolute" zero solution in 1982 would have meant a reduction of defense. "That is not the government's intention, as that also was not the case for 1981," the prime minister said, thereby justifying the government's abandonment of the so-called "zero solution."

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CIVIL DEFENSE CHIEF ADMITS NOT READY FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 25 Mar 81 p 9

[Article by Klavs Andersen: "We Are Not Able to Protect Ourselves Against Gas Warfare"]

[Text] Danish Civil Defense is in the extraordinary situation of having developed and patented a so-called "gas cap" which, in combination with the existing shelter space, can protect the civilian population against the effects of chemical warfare.

The "gas cap" exists as a prototype, and Civil Defense has taken out a patent on the cap in the United States and elsewhere, but in Denmark we cannot afford to put the cap into production. Civil Defense is in a situation where they cannot do anything at all against gas for chemical warfare purposes.

Lauritz Hvidt, who is in charge of administration in Civil Defense, says: "If Copenhagen is attacked with chemical weapons, Civil Defense will not be able to do anything at all, practically speaking."

In 1969, Civil Defense put out a memorandum on preparedness against chemical warfare. However, that memorandum never produced any practical consequences. It was drowned in the zeal for economy of the seventies.

Armed Forces Headquarters takes the threat of a possible war fought with chemical weapons seriously. The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, Lieutenant General G. K. Kristensen, says:

"In view of the information we have on the Warsaw Pact countries' stocks of chemical weapons, we have to consider the possibility of a war in which chemical weapons might be used."

The fact that the Armed Forces take the threat of gas for chemical warfare purposes seriously can also be deduced from the fact that the Danish soldiers and Home Guard personnel are equipped with a so-called ABC mask. Among other things, that mask provides protection against chemical agents.

Civil Defense thinks that the price of a "gas cap" will be 30 or 35 kroner. That means that if they are going to produce caps for the entire population it will cost between 150 and 175 million kroner. Added to that will be the amount it will cost to develop a gas mask for children. There is no such mask at present.

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HEAD OF PARLIAMENTARY DEFENSE COMMISSION COMMENTS

Helsinki SUOMEN KUVALEHTI in Finnish 13 Mar 81 p 18-21

"Finland's military-political position is sheltered." So idyllically sees the third parliamentary defense commission the position of neutral Finland in the stormy world. Word choice hardly means that the Finnish young rabbit would have pushed its head into a bush, or does it? General Secretary of the Defense Commission, lieutenant-colonel Gustav Hagglund comments.

[Text] The supporting pillars of the Finnish security policy are the results of two strong-willed presidents' work during the course of decades. These foundations naturally don't change in a few years.

The third parliamentary defense commission--which might well remain the last one for a long time--mainly follows its predecessors' line although the tone is pessimistic.

"Uncertainty about the direction of the future development is unusually great. Is the present state of detente only a temporary setback or a permanent state of tension or an ever tightening conflict?" the head of the commission, Lieutenant-Colonel Gustav Hagglund asks, as puzzled as all the others.

During times of uncertainty the commission's words about Finland's sheltered position seem strange--as if Finland were in clover among the big powder barrels.

"Finland's military-political position is sheltered in the present situation," the commission says.

General Secretary Gustav Hagglund thinks that the words are perhaps not the best possible ones when taken separately.

According to the commission there is neutral Sweden in the west with which Finland has traditionally close relations. In the east and the south our neighbor is the Soviet Union with which we have the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance.

In the south the distances are long to the Middle European military center. In the north, on the other hand, Norway has restricted the activities of its NATO allies in questions concerning Finland.

There was a great deal of discussion about registering the interpretation of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. It has become publicly known that the suggestion of an important foreign policy adviser to the president is that the military-political articles of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance be applied only after a military attack has taken place, in other words, not until the war has broken out.

Gustav Hagglund doesn't want to comment on this in any way. The final text has the same wording as the previous commission repord did: military-political articles of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance can be applied after a military attack has taken place or when the threat of such an attack has been mutually established.

This kind of commission work surely has its own advantages but it is rather strange that different kinds of alternatives are presented, like in a "market meeting," on the vital questions of the country. It is good enough that there is no voting on these questions.

Equally hollow sounded party politicians' conflicting statements like "in my opinions" we could have "somewhat fewer such and such weapons."

One must remember, however, that the commission recommends; the president, the government, the parliament and--the general staff in its own part--make the decisions.

Finnish Model of Threat

Finland tries to develop its armed forces so that the utilization of our country for military purposes can be prevented. The Swedes make so-called threat models which affect the defense systems of our neighboring country.

"Finland doesn't have corresponding threat models because enemy is the one who attacks us. We don't have any other enemies," says the General Secretary.

In its time the first parliamentary defense commission considered the possibility of nuclear weapons being used to be smaller. The third commission will have to assert that the risks have increased and that even the threshold of employment might have become lower.

Finland is a small, neutral country which, through this commission, has comprehensively mapped out its position and power resources in the era of daily developing nuclear weapons.

According to General Secretary Gustav Hagglund there is no reason to feel totally hopeless, but:

"We have estimated what we Finns can demand what we can't. We cannot measure our power resources on the basis of nuclear war. It's not possible."

"The realistic goal in the defense of the country is that the purpose is above all an ability to fend off an attack made with limited conventional forces against Finland or through it."

Besides, in Paris Finland committed itself to not having nuclear weapons in its territory.

"Equally unlikely is a big military athletic contest. We can't build our defense ability based on that, either."

There are no strategic targets in Finland that would, as such, tempt anybody to attack this territory. Finland's military political significance on the maps of the big powers depends on how Finland's territory can be used in order "to reach the strategic targets outside it during a possible crisis or war."

"The goal of the Finnish defense is that the losses and waste of time of a possible attacker are not worth the advantages. And it's not enough that we Finns believe this but others have to believe it, too," General Secretary Gustav Hagglund thinks.

"It's the task of the defensive forces to show that the military use of our territory is not worthwhile considering the time and sacrifice involved," the General Secretary reads from the commission's official text to support his message.

"Now we have considered in a more detailed manner what can be expected of a country's military defense and what can't, we have individualized performance requirements for the defensive forces as well as set the goals for long-range development."

Important Coast of Murmansk

The commission is again mapping out the Nordic position from Finland's and from the big powers' point of view. It is well known that after the Second World War the importance of the sea territories bordering on northern Europe has continuously increased.

This is all due to the fact that the Soviet Union's perhaps most important network of military bases on the Kola peninsula is situated on the coast, the only one on its Atlantic territory that is free of ice year-round.

The Soviet Union has developed its northern navy since the 1960's. The main part of its submarines that carry long-distance nuclear missiles is based on the naval bases on Murmansk coast. And it is these submarines that hold the key position in the nuclear strategy of the big powers.

Fish, oil and gas add to the importance of the area but they are small bets in the big power game.

In its military systems the Soviet Union emphasizes the defense of the network of military bases on Murmansk coast in order to secure, in all circumstances, the working ability of its nuclear submarines based in that area, the report says.

Consequently we must consider that the primary task of the ground, sea and air forces on the Kola peninsula is to protect the submarines and the counterattack ability that they provide.

But the weapons systems provided to protect the submarines also make it possible to conduct war operations to disturb NATO's sea links and neutralize its armed forces in northern Norway.

Finland Now on Center Line

The development of weapons technology has had a considerable effect on North European military-political position. The prospects of development have brought factors of uncertainty into the future picture of the world.

"One of these is the cruise missile which, flying low, can also violate the air space of neutral countries." Finland has always been exotically far away from Europe's main war theaters," Gustav Hagglund says.

With regard to nuclear war Finland has now moved to the center line or axis. With regard to ordinary, conventional war we are still the same out-of-the-way country.

Although it has been technically possible for airplanes to carry nuclear arsenals even through the air space of neutral countries for decades, the cruise missile, which is harder to detect than an airplane, will bring additional challenges for the air defense of neutral countries.

"It's hard to detect a cruise missile with radar." They are small missiles covered with plastic material which absorbs the radar rays and fly as high as 30 to 50 meters along valleys."

"It has been unofficially estimated in western newspapers that the Soviet Union must invest 30 to 40 billion dollars (120-160 billion marks) for the defense of cruise missiles," Gustav Hagglund says.

What will Finland do?

"Finland's defense is also based on radar but the commission will not change our whole defensive system because of this new type of weapon."

The commission states shortly that our existing surveillance and defensive systems should be supplemented as much as is possible for us in the same proportion as the cruise missiles are developing," Gustav Hagglund says.

Weapons to Norwegian Coast

Neutral Sweden is in the west, more to the north is NATO country Norway. The reconnaissance, surveillance and communications systems in Norway are of considerable importance for the United States. In the possible event of a war it would be possible to make strategic attacks on the northwestern parts of the Soviet Union with air and navy forces based in Norway.

Even though the cooperation between Norway and its allies has become consolidated, Norway has, however, informed that it will hold on to its self-determined restrictions--and it has pointed out that the country has not made any preparations for accepting nuclear weapons.

Disappointed Generals

Finland, following this big power game, tries to take care of its own territory effectively and credibly. As one important point the commission suggests that in order to prevent the utilization of our territory we should establish emergency troops to fulfill the requirements of the 1990's.

"In practice this means a permanent division of our reserve forces into two categories: into relatively well-equipped emergency troops, at the most 250,000 men, and into other troops equipped with modern weapons, Gustav Hagglund says.

The commission has prepared an individualized program to develop the armed forces during 1982 to 1982. It is suggested that military defense will use 17.5 billion marks. The defense expenses would increase realistically 3.8 percent yearly during the recommended period.

In the commission this recommended allowance seemed to go as high as the Social Democrats were able "to tolerate." As the appropriate of the previous commission meant a 5 percent increase, the growth is now clearly going down.

The commander of the Armed Forces and the permanent military advisers of the commission pointed out in their views to the commission that the basic alternative is the lowest expenditure that can be justified by military and security political views.

However, the commission arrived at a sum below this "limit" or basic alternative. As, according to the recommendation of the second parliamentary defense commission, the appropriated order allowances take almost half of the procurement funds from 1982 to 1986, the disappointment of the generals is apparent.

In their opinion the cuts would affect the new development plans. They also considered the 15-year development program too slow.

The Treasury Department seems unconditional in its effort to cut all expenses. And this is what will happen to the generals and the army they lead if the recommendations will hold in the government and in the Parliament as well as they have done before.

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'PRELIMINARIES' TO DETERRENCE VIEWED IN BRIEF

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Mar 81 pp 33-38

[Article by Gen Francois Valentin: "The Vanguard of Dissuasion;" for related material see JPRS 77821 dated 14 April 1981, No 1733 of this series, pp 20-47]

[Text] Battle or non-battle? I do not like those terms very much, first of all because it would be more accurate to say: to fight or not to fight, which sounds different, and also because the idea evoked by the word battle, on a chosen terrain and with supply lines does not translate today's reality.

We will speak about that below: but first I will say a few words about the political situation in Europe. The stability which has been seen in this Asian cape, thanks to the bringing together of American, French and English means of dissuasion and the presence of sizeable conventional forces, has led many observers to believe that the real stakes lay elsewhere, that it was by turning toward the south of the Western World that Soviet power had managed to obtain its goal of world domination, that in this way the efforts realized to increase military means focused on the defense of Europe were in part useless. I do not deny, certainly, the threats which come out of the development of the Russian navy, no more than those which correspond to the advent of a multipolar world or of a kind of Islamic imperialism. But, without being an alarmist without going from chloroform to panic, as often happends in the democracies, is it not clear that beyond the reasons for tension which had become apparent over the past 35 years, a cause of destabilization, if not new at least until now always a limited one, is becoming visible. By this is meant the development of internal tensions within the communist world. The reactions which the Soviet leaders might have if these tensions became more widespread, the movements which might spring up in terms in charge of the control leavers, the reflexes which fear might cause among statesmen, the party leaders, the military leaders, are unforseeable.

The geographical position of France, the place conferred to it by its independent policy, the special nature of the division of our country into various political families, comprise original characteristics. But these characteristics in no case allow us to forget that if this position does not imply probable danger, the threat of an attack in Europe is most dangerous.

This threat has often been analyzed. For some, if the Soviets decide upon an attack against Western Europe, it would be part of a carefully considered plan the goal of which would be to bring a large part of the adversary's forces to its knees in a brief time period. What the Americans call theater nuclear arms,

which the Russians also have, would allow selective strikes against the German forces, for example, because of their accuracy and spare cities or other forces. I do not say that this hypothesis should be ignored, but it seems to me quite unlikely for two reasons: first, the SS 20 fire missiles with three charges of 150 TK each, perhaps even, according to certain authors, 450 TK. These are not selective arms but arms with a great effective range, and firing 200 carriers, that is 600 charges, would have such enormous effects on West Germany, as it is now constituted, that it would be difficult to decide if it was an attack against armed forces or against cities. I add that the accuracy attributed to the SS 20 does not come from information from Russian sources, but from an American estimate based on the United States' capability. On the other hand, we have reason to believe that the mobility of the SS 20 is only a semi-mobility and that its use requires that the battery positions be prepared in advance. The second reason which permits me to doubt that hypothesis is that Soviet doctrine, many details of which have varied from time to time, has been consistent on the necessity of leading the offensive by first striking the adversary's means of launching missiles.

Why then crush the German forces, which have no nuclear weapons, and spare the Americans and French who do?

I continue to consider this hypothesis as one of those which will be especially valid if the development of materiel leads, in a few years, the Russians to multiply the very weak charges to the detriment of strong or medium charges, which is not even the case today in the weapons available to the large land forces.

Others believe that the Soviets' great superiority in tanks and combat planes would allow them to rout the forces of the West, very quickly and that nothing can be built without a massive effort to balance the conventional armies of the West with those of the East. Two qualifying statements must be made about this idea. The first is that it is dangerous to add purely and simply the number of tanks belonging to the USSR and those of its satellites. The armies of the latter could raise problems. The second is that, with the hovering threat of an allied atomic reaction, the possible aggressor could not proceed with strong concentrations. Its present doctrine is moreover to attack on broad fronts, while trying to exploit deeply the weak points of the opposition. I add that, in order to counter the danger of precision guided weapons, it has raised the percentage of mechanized infantry in its forces. The terrain of West Germany is for the most part difficult to cross, whether in the south because of the mountains, or in the north because of rivers, canals, etc. The accumulation of means is therefore not easy, at least without becoming vulnerable. Thus, the Soviet superiority due to numbers would obviously become clear, but only in time. According to the season, the ability of its leaders and of its soldiers, this delay might vary, but one can estimate that at a minimum it would only be after 8 to 10 days that this factor would come fully into play.

It follows from what I have said above that, without my rejecting other hypotheses, the most dangerous one seems to me to be the one concerning an error in calculation by the Soviets who, considering that the West will not react to a conventional attack by the use of the atom, might think themselves able to rout the allied forces by attacks over broad fronts, profiting, after a relatively short delay, from the superiority given them by the intervention of their second line and their reserves.

In such a situation, what would France do? And, first of all, is it, as they say today, concerned? Yes, because a Soviet attack would not have as its goal conquering German territory, which would have only slight consequences on a world scale, but quite obviously would be aimed at achieving access to the Atlantic, and the assurances and caresses which would be lavished on us would only be a temporary ploy. And even if, escaping from the contagion of defeat or submission, we were absolutely determined, as would be our duty, to use on our won our strategic nuclear force in case of a later attack against our territory, the adversary, if we were to let him, would interpret the lack of reaction on our part as the inability to react and would have doubts about our will to resist.

How then can we show this will? How should we take into account the danger of a weakening of the Western forces which, in case of fighting lasting beyond a few days, might be overwhelmed. How, if there is a beginning of a failure of dissuasion, can we attempt to halt the conflict? There is almost no choice other than to use, while there is still time, a force which has not been affected by the first shock, linking that use to a raising of the stakes producing from the aggressor the danger of an escalation which he has underestimated.

According to the circumstances, such an offensive, or group of counterattacks, might be undertaken either to parry the most dangerous thrusts, or preferably by choosing deliberately the directions which would be the most effective in forcing the adversary to reshuffle his forces.

But the more threat of such a counterattack would be dissuasive, insofar as the forces being used would be of appropriate size and quality and not intended to plug up holes.

The affirmation, while there is still peace, that this intervention is part of the measures under consideration and preparation is a strengthening of dissuasion. THis is so provided that the affirmation is situated in the context of a general policy of dissuasion and not in one of a group of conventional actions having as their goal raising the nuclear threshold and prolonging the fighting. On the contrary, telling the adversary that France will not participate in fighting in the European theater, or will only use symbolic forces, can only have an anti-dissuasive effect, because the aggressor will be encouraged to think that beyond our frontiers he can, as far as we are concerned, allow himself to do what he wants.

The difficulties of the action we envisage are obvious however: on the terrain we would have to move quickly, coordinate all fire and movements of mechanized forces, exploit all successes fully, while realizing that it was only a temporary measure and of a limited strategic import.

In an operation lasting 48 hours, on a front from 100 to 120 km wide, 1,200 to 1,500 tanks, with good air support, can exploit nuclear strikes and, through local successes, impose a delay for reflection.

Of course, the destruction would be enormous. But would it be any less if we went directly to the use of strategic nuclear weapons? And the use of reduced power, the use of the reinforced radiation bomb, without suppressing side effects, can reduce them.

On the political level, there would still be the decision of the Franch Government, which would have to be made quickly, or else the use of our forces, and of the First Army Corps in particular (I am not speaking of the Third, whose position seems a little uncertain) would be too late. So, if the NATO concept is clear enough on recourse to tactical nuclear weapons, we know that, quite naturally, the Germans, and to a great extent the Americans, relying on the possibilities offered by precision guided weapons, have a tendency to postpone this raising of stakes. That would inevitably be a subject of disagreement which, although it would most likely disappear by itself because of the enemy if the situation became rapidly worse, would on the contrary grow more bitter if the conflict got bogged down at the beginning. But in that case, the intervention of our armies would be less urgent, without, nevertheless, the interest in being able to use the only important reserves in the European theater being itself diminished.

You can understand that on the choice of the operation I must be discreet; I will only say that a careful study of a group of operations broad enough, without its being seen as a rigid framework, must permit reflections and making arrangements so that, if the case should arise, we would not be caught unprepared.

As for the number of nuclear projectiles necessary, it should be large enough so that their effect would be felt by the adversary immediately and that rules out the concept, severely criticized by Mr Pompidou, of warning shot, which would only result in bringing about a heavy strike against our forces. This number is obviously linked to the ability of our mechanized units to channel and slow up the adversary's forces and to our possibilities of detecting and locating targets. I will add by way of conclusion that, if the decision of the French Government is to be completely free and founded solely on the interests of France, fire coordination, even of atomic weapons, can be prepared in advance presupposing our intervention. Such an attitude seems to me to conform to what General De Gaulle was saying at a press conference in 1963. Explaining why and how France was led to having its own atomic force, he stated: "that does not exclude at all the action of that force from being combined with that of analagous forces of our allies."

In conclusion, France not being able to do everything, it is important to arrive at clear choices. The number one priority remains for me the strategic nuclear force, the guarantee of our independence, a trump card guaranteeing our security in the last resort, the only unmortaged means depending a decision making center located in Europe. But then, it must be the maneuverable air and ground forces which are used to show in time our determination and to demonstrate the importance of our position in Europe. They are the vanguard of dissuasion.

6956
CSO: 3100/606

STRATEGIC DETERRENCE RECOMMENDATIONS DISCUSSED

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Mar 81 pp 49-54

[Article by Gen Jean Thiry: "Strategic Paths: A Battle in Europe?"; for related material see JPRS 77821 dated 14 April 1981, No 1733 of this series, pp 20-47]

[Text] A battle in Europe: a question mark. I do not think I am completely lacking in imagination, but that battle, in which both sides would rely heavily on nuclear weapons, I cannot imagine. Whether it would be a battle stretched out over a front or sophisticated movements of armored units and planes, with attacks and counterattacks, flanking maneuvers, or even isolated fighting amidst a frightened population which had fled from towns and villages. I cannot imagine that at all. On the other hand, I can see quite clearly the other form of war, that of long distance attacks against cities, factories and production centers or power plants, millions of dead, the disorganization of the country. It is frightening, but not unimaginable.

Whatever the case may be, whether it is that battle fought "from a distance" or the battle which used to be called a "proximity" battle, nuclear war presents terrifying prospects which sweep away the ideas which were held before the advent of the atom. There is in that situation the reason and the means to prevent the war by means of dissuasion. In Europe, should the battle, more precisely the preparation of the battle, enter into dissuasion? Is it an essential element of it, possessing in itself its own dissuasive power, or is it only complementary to a strategic discussion based on the threat of reprisals against the cities or the vital centers of the adversary? Is it only the prelude to that strategic situation, which is to say, the first step in a sequential dissuasion, whose prospect ought to discourage the adversary beforehand from any aggressive enterprise and if, perhaps, one were undertaken, to convince him of his error and to persuade him to stop. In order to answer these questions, or simply to try to understand the problem with some clarity, I propose to you to abandon the intellectual attitudes which have appeared here and there on this subject, basing myself on a chart which I used in a talk before CHEM, a little over 20 years ago. I had called it: "The Paths of Strategy." It is the same one. Only the two next to last lines have been added: Reprisals--"Flexible" Responses (which had not yet been invented) and the abbreviations FNS, ANT, PGM, which are known by everyone even though they are not all in the same language. 1

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1. Editor's Note: CHEM: Center of High Military Studies
FNS: Strategic Nuclear Force
ANT: Tactical Nuclear Weapon
PGM: Precision Guided Missle

There are many paths in this labyrinth and two doors leading out: war (which we do not want) and peace, which means a successful dissuasion.

On the subject of dissuasion, I would like to note in passing that there is in that word a kind of paradox which many people do not understand. The paradox lies in the fact that it is the action which would be taken if dissuasion failed which is the basis for this dissuasion. It is therefore false to say, as we sometimes hear, that our defense is based on the refusal to go to war, that our nuclear armament is an armament based on non-use, or even that there could be no question, in case of the failure of dissuasion, of using these means which were intended to insure it.

In order to ward off the danger of a land attack in Europe, a refusal announced in advance to go to war would obviously be contrary to dissuasion.

But let us return to the chart.

The absolutists believe that the only dissuasion worth anything consists in confronting the potential adversary with the risk of nuclear reprisals against its vital elements, in particular its cities. Certainly, the value of this form of dissuasion must not be denied. But it must also be recognized that, reduced to that, it takes on a suicidal aspect which affects its credibility. In addition, it rests on the myth of badly understood national independence, in which nuclear weapons, by ruling out alliances, would condemn us to a solitary defense limited to a national sanctuary.

In reality, the defense of France is inseparable from that of its European neighbors. To dissuasion through reprisal, which is hard to imagine being applied to others than oneself, must be added or combined, a dissuasion through battle, which would be the act of all the nations participating in the defense of Europe. That battle must have as its objective a forward defense, its preparation thus becoming a key element of a dissuasion extending beyond national sanctuaries.

Certain absolutists have substituted for the pure and hard doctrine of reprisal after a case of aggression a strange doctrine known as "warning." This consists of testing the intentions of the aggressor in the field, then, with a few tactical nuclear strikes, showing him our resolve to resort to the use of strategic nuclear forces--as if such a hesitation to strike his forces could show a determination to massacre his population and perhaps to undergo, in a counter attack, a similar fate. It would mean, actually, losing the first battle in order to be more quickly driven to reprisal. And we would remain indifferent to seeing everything along the borders of France fall into the hands of the enemy. This pseudo-defense is generally supposed to have two aspects: a frontal defense, which would be left to the Germans, to the Americans and to other members of NATO, and a second line, our nuclear strategic force. Let Europe perish, so long as France survives: what a deadly illusion.

Opposed to these fallacious or illusory doctrines are those professed by the traditionalists. They are of two kinds.

The first think atomic weapons raise so many problems and are so terrifying, that no one will ever dare use them. There is no dissuasion except in the use of the

atom. The atom destroys the atom, but not war. Some people think however, that conventional precision weapons, the PGM's as the Americans call them, might allow a non-nuclear dissuasion. I won't pursue those arguments.

The others think that the threat of using numerous tactical nuclear weapons, with high operational efficiency, possesses in itself a great dissuasive power, dominated certainly by strategic dissuasion, but, because of the stability of the latter, with an extremely low risk of escalation.

For my part, I tend to take the middle road, that of the relativists. That is, I believe in the dissuasive strength of battle, without forgetting however the dissuasion which a potential aggressor must feel from the threat of escalation, of a fatal meshing of gears. But I do not believe that we must systematically seek, favor this escalation or meshing of gears.

As for the battle, which I said I could imagine only with great difficulty, it is precisely its risks, the danger in which the aggressor would find himself, which generate dissuasion.

In order to do this, it seems to me that this battle, that this frontal battle, must be conceived of as a battle designed to halt an advance, with appropriate defensive measures and the support of tactical atomic weapons. Its primary use must be reserved for the possible, if not probable, case in which the aggressor would not use his own at the beginning of the game. Nuclear strikes would have to be numerous as well as effective and there would have to be reserve nuclear fire power.

The characteristics of the reinforced radiation weapon seem to me particularly important for a blocking battle.

Of course, that blocking battle, that forward battle, must not let us think that there would be no deeply penetrating nuclear actions, that the rear areas would be left alone. The potential adversary, we know, has at his dispostion a large number of planes or missiles capable of such actions. Dissuasion through battle rests therefore also on the existence of weapons capable of reaching far behind the adversary's lines. I am thinking less here of strategic actions in the sense used by the absolutists than of interdicting action aimed at preventing the enemy from supplying and sustaining his offensive operations. The means of carrying out such actions are, in the West, practically nonexistent.

Everything I have just been saying is, I readily admit, rather theoretical. And we are not in a concrete situation as taught at the military school, with two similar sides, a red and a blue. In the concert of nations which participate in the defense of Europe, including the United States, the least that can be said is that there is no unity of views.

I want to emphasize only one point, which seems essential. There are many tactical nuclear arms in Western Europe. Except for ours, they are American. Thus, what is called the "flexible" response, which must be translated, I think, by "adapted" response, aims at employing nuclear weapons only if things go badly and, in that case, to use only short-range weapons, in the hope that nuclear war will remain limited to Europe, the risk of escalating to the United States having been eliminated.



Key:

1. Paths of Strategy
2. Absolutists
3. Relativists
4. Traditionalists
5. Battle at a Distance
6. Proximity Battle
7. Cities
8. Terrains-Sites
9. Support
10. Reprisals
11. Flexible Reprisals
12. Strategic Nuclear Force
13. Tactical Nuclear Weapon
14. Precision Guided Missile
15. Peace
16. War

This "flexible" response is not at all dissuasive and that probably explains many things about the present concept of the use of our maneuverable forces: total autonomy in decision-making as to their use, the refusal to occupy an exposed position on the front, a position "reserved" for our forces, that is, hypothetical NATO reserves, etc.

A change in inter-Allied relationships, a change in the structures of the Atlantic Alliance seem necessary. Is that possible? Will Europe one day play a larger role in its defense?

That would be desirable. If not, the security of Europe and of France, reduced to mere national dissuasion, will not be assured.

8956
CSO: 3100/607

GREEK AMBASSADOR'S INDEPENDENCE DAY MESSAGE PUBLISHED

Nicosia O AGON in Greek 25 Mar 81 p 5

/Text/ In a message to the people of Cyprus on the anniversary of 25 March 1821, Greek Ambassador Zakharakis said the following:

Greek men and women of Cyprus:

In the life of every nation inevitably come certain moments which indelibly stamp its course through history, determining decisively its future course and leading it sometimes to decay and decline and other times to a national rejuvenation. Every country, no matter how many and how great its historical moments may be, selects a single day in which it embodies all its majesty and all its ideals. For modern Greece which was destined by fate to have many moments of trial and great achievement, such a day is the 25th of March which is not only a worthy reminder of Hellenism's historic past and powerful reaffirmation of its unbroken historical presence in our time, but also an inestimable guide for the forthcoming generations of the entire nation.

For this reason, today as every year, all Greeks are called to honor the anniversary of National Renaissance and to turn their minds and memories to this supreme, no doubt, moment of their modern history, drawing from it lessons and hope--lessons because the deeper meaning of today's celebration is an example, since the struggle of 1821 teaches us what we must do and what to avoid in order to remain free and secure, and hope because that struggle manifested the power of Greek virtue which is made of faith and valor and determination, which is not rooted in selfishness or material need, and which has shown that it can turn the national vision into historic truth, albeit step by step and painfully, but always victorious in the end.

In the 8 years of the national liberation war we find all the virtues and all the vices of our nation crowded together. But learning about the record of the 1821 revolution is the most apt method every thinking Greek can use to learn about himself, because it offers the most brilliant illustrations of our virtues, the endurance of our historical consciousness, our faith in the idea of the nation and the courage, boldness and initiative of Hellenism. And also because it offers us sad illustrations of our weaknesses which we all know and which were so dramatically denounced by the great poet of Freedom /Dionysios Solomos/ calling on us to fight against discord and blind passion which springs from an uncontrollable

egotism and tramples upon all sense of duty toward the nation and which, alas, emerges not only in tranquil periods but also in the most difficult hours with fatal and disastrous consequences.

To be fully aware of these dangers is a most pressing and timely necessity today when the time is critical and may become deadly because the threats against the entire nation are not always visible and immediate, as in past years, but take various and often deceptive forms.

Recalling its 160 years of free existence, when Greece crystallized its historic character in the modern world, at times excelling, at times sinning, at times progressing and at times retrogressing, at times being strong in unity and at times weak in discord, the nation is learning from its past. And while adjusting its course to the modern social and intellectual currents of the freedom-loving peoples, it looks fixedly and with justified optimism and ambition on the threshhold of the next century.

A new historic phase is opening up before us which will allow us, by strengthening the power and international prestige of our country, to engage in projects of culture and progress within the wider community of the free, democratic European world. We shall pursue, thus, a joint effort, the strengthening of peace, the strengthening of social justice and the safeguarding of democratic freedoms, in conjunction with the increase of spiritual and material goods which form the infrastructure of the civilization of today's democratic Europe; and the strengthening at the same time of our relations with all countries and especially our northern Balkan neighbors, by applying without exception the dogma of peaceful coexistence with all peoples.

Greece, accepting the historical challenge and responding to the call of the times, has come out of its age-long loneliness and has become an equal member of a great political, economic, and cultural family, while preserving at the same time its national and spiritual identity, the Greek identity, that is, of the nation which from the days of Homer until today has remained unaltered inside our soul; /preserving/ the national consciousness of all Greeks through the ages; the cluster of our basic intellectual and spiritual traits of our virtues and defects, our good and bad points--the identity which has never disappeared throughout the entire Greek area and which will determine the course of our nation in the future. This is the national consciousness which guarantees Greece's attachment to its democratic institutions.

It is this national consciousness which at the same time guarantees in advance that Greece will deal decisively, as in the past, with every unprovoked threat directed against its freedom, independence and territorial integrity.

Finally, it is this national consciousness which guarantees Greece's total support to the beloved kindred Hellenism of Cyprus who is suffering for the seventh year in a row despite the continuing constructive and practical expressions of good will shown by the Cypriot government for promoting a genuine, honest, and effective dialogue.

Greek brothers of Cyprus:

The wholehearted, multi-sided and essential support of the Greek government, the political world, the entire Greek people and of all Greeks throughout the world, will continue with the same vigor until the peaceful struggle of the Cypriot Hellenism is completed and an honest and permanent solution is achieved, a solution which will safeguard an independent, integral, free, and law-governed Cypriot State in which all its citizens, lawful citizens, will be able to express without harassment their national origin and personality.

The Greek support is offered spontaneously and without ulterior motives to the Cypriot Hellenism, in the context of the national whole which is defined by the community and identity of religion, language, historical tradition and (historical) memory--in other words, by the common consciousness of nationalism of all Greeks who were separated through the ages by the dissimilar historical fate of each national region. This cooperation is given, therefore, as a spontaneous expression of the highest national duty and national solidarity, away from sterile chauvinistic or nationalistic thoughts and without ulterior motives of political, economic, strategic, or other calculations. Although at times this support is being questioned either because of genuine doubts and maybe understandable worries, or because of deliberate distortions and doubts, it is nevertheless the only safeguard on which the Hellenism of Cyprus can rely without hesitation. The Hellenism of Cyprus knows that throughout history many groupings came together or were imposed--religious, social, class, or even state--but no grouping has proved stronger than the grouping of a nation which is forged with ancient and eternal blood ties, because the Hellenism of Cyprus further knows that people who suffered blows or temporary trials in their state existence and identity were able sooner or later, with faith and patience, to restore their rights and to survive. On the other hand, people who allowed themselves to be led by deceptive slogans to a national castration and the inevitable consequent national consciousness-gap ended inevitably in total extinction.

With these thoughts, Greek men and women of Cyprus, with faith in the future of the nation and with the sincere wish that the Hellenism of Cyprus will safeguard its unity as the pupil of one's eye, remaining unswervingly loyal to the ultimate goal of saving the long-suffering and heroic Island which will see, I am sure, better days, I bring to you a message of brotherly love from the government and the people of Greece.

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HUGE ARCHEOLOGICAL PARK PLANNED IN ATHENS

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 25 Mar 81 p 11

[Text] A veritable 3-kilometer-long oasis in the midst of the urban desert of the capital, showing our ancient monuments in all their splendor and giving the concrete-surrounded Athenian the opportunity to walk quietly for 2 hours undisturbed by cars and honking...will be "born" in the center of Athens with the projected unification of the fragmented open spaces from Arditos Hill to Kerameikos.

A huge archeological park covered by trees and shrubs, with paths for pedestrians, trails, benches, open-air cafes and snack bars, playgrounds, and so forth will be created with the integration into one single entity of Arditos Hill, the Zappeion, the Olympian Zeus Columns, the Akropolis, Filopappos Hill, the Thiseion, the Plaka, the ancient Agora and the Kerameikos.

All this is a specific plan with realistic proposals whose realization has already been adopted by the appropriate services and by Minister of Zoning, Housing, and Environment Plytas. The originator of this idea is architect Alex. Fotiadis who, together with architects K. Kyrtsis and D. Katarapoulos, architect-city planner Elis. Mitsopoulou and traffic engineers N. Vlathopoulos and K. Lymberi put together the plan which was first made public by TAXYDROMOS in its 44th issue of 1 November 1979.

Initially there were objections to accepting it. But following insistent efforts by its originators, the appropriate services and the minister of zoning, housing, and environment accepted the idea and were convinced of its feasibility. Now it is expected to be approved by the Council of Ministers according to "Parakimios" writing in the latest issue of TAXYDROMOS, and the gradual implementation of the plan, a "divine gift" for the Athenians, will be seen.

The benefit will be tremendous beyond any cost. It is believed that the center of Athens will find its old profile as recorded in old prints, the area which is being suffocated by gas fumes will be able to breathe again, the ancient monuments and especially the Akropolis will be relieved of the daily scorching of pollution fumes. The Athenian will acquire a large open park in which to stroll quietly, without the necessity of going to the suburbs, to Parnitha Mountain, or elsewhere.

According to this plan the green area will begin at the Arditos Hill which will be connected with the Zappeion Park and the Olympian Zeus Columns with a pedestrian-

bridge, without interfering with vehicular traffic. The hill will be developed with benches, playgrounds for children, and so forth. The rear side of the hill today is completely closed and nobody can enjoy its beautiful view. From the developed platform above the street level the pedestrians will descend by ramp.

The Zappeion will be combined with the Olympian Zeus Columns by means of a bridge at the present level of the Queen Olgas Avenue, which will be rebuilt underground at a depth of approximately 6 meters. The avenue was built in 1956-1960. The bus terminals currently on this avenue will be shifted to the underground section thus relieving the area of the present ugliness. At the same time, the plan provides for an underground garage for approximately 800 cars. The resulting plateau on top will be planted with trees to join the green park of Zappeion and the green area behind the columns of the Olympian Zeus. The area of sports installations (swimming pool, and so on) will be separated from the archeological section of the columns of the Olympian Zeus through an artificial grassy knoll.



"A 3-Kilometer Park from Kerameikos to Stadium" is the title of the relevant archeological study. By connecting open areas a huge archeological park will be "born" enriched with abundant green recreational center, walkways, benches, playgrounds, and so on.

Between the columns of the Olympian Zeus and the Akropolis, it is proposed that initially at least the unification will be visual. The main obstacle in this is the interference of three or four city blocks behind the Evangelist Church which distort the visual contact with the foothills of the Akropolis and Plaka.

To overcome this obstacle, the plan proposes the purchase by the state of those buildings at an estimated cost of approximately 800 million drachmas. Among the buildings in this area are several neo-classic ones which will be preserved for use for other purposes or for museums to be in direct contact with the pedestrians. But to unify completely this area it is proposed to construct an underpass in front of the Adrian Gate to serve the cars from Syngrou Avenue to the intersection of Filellinon Street and Amalias Avenue, with the necessary traffic adjustments in conjunction with the beltway.

Dionysiou Areopagitou Street and Ag. Pavlou Street which circle the Akropolis and constitute a basic source of gas fumes affecting the monuments will be reserved for pedestrians only, with only a section left to local traffic (for area residents). The longest part of Areopagitou Street will be planted with trees to be united with the green areas in front of the Herodion Theater and the ancient theater of Dionysos. At the same time, the spot where the Makrygiannis Camp used to be will be united with the rest, and as the TO VIMA reported, it will become a park while the Akropolis Museum will be relocated to the traditional building of the camp. At the turning of Dionysios Areopagitou Street toward the Church of Agios Dimitris Lombardiaris there will be a small square at the point where the pedestrian path leading to Filopappou Hill begins (designed by Pikionis).

The northern side of the hill has been beautified, but the southern side remains undeveloped and poor in appearance. The study proposes the appropriate utilisation of the south side by planting trees, opening walkways with benches, a recreation area with a cafeteria and a playground, so that the entire hill will become a significant recreational spot for the Athenians. With appropriate development the under-utilised area behind the theater of Dora Stratou will be revitalised while at the same time the significance of the beltway around Filopappou Hill will be underlined.

From Filopappou Hill the pedestrian will walk downhill on Ag. Pavlos Street which will be reserved for pedestrians only and through various levels will go through Thission Park which ends at the subway tracks with the present road.

At this point a huge square will be created, approximately 10 stremmas with a spectacular view of the Akropolis. The railroad tracks which are already deep in the ground will be covered and Thission Square will be extended to Kerameikos above Ermou Street. This part of Ermou Street as well as the street above the Thission subway station will be underground. In this way Kerameikos will be connected with the ancient Agora. The new square will be planted with trees to form a unified whole with Thission Park. At the same time, there will be a restoration of the beautiful facades of the neo-classic buildings which are now destroyed by the bus terminals.

The idea of composing the monuments on the Akropolis into an integrated whole started with the festival of the Panathinaia. The procession which carried the sacred vale to Goddess Athina started at Kerameikos, passed through the Agora and followed a course which allowed the participants to see the rock of the Akropolis rising above the city, with the Parthenon dominating the entire composition. Indeed, the procession, after reaching the Agora square and the Areios Pagos Hill, passed by the eastern side of the Akropolis along the southern walls...

This idea of combining in sequence the areas of Kerameikos, the Agora, and the foothills of the Akropolis is basic /to any effort/ to revitalise it again in connection with the main monument. The study includes several traffic rearrangements so that the unification of the ancient monuments will not affect traffic directly. The two traffic engineers who participated in the preparation of the study are proposing a specific solution for the most troublesome traffic knot, the area of the columns of the Olympian Zeus.

The traffic axis of Syngrou-Amalias-Syntagma is constantly in a jam because of the poor intersections at the level of Vas. Olgas Avenue. The same happens with Kallirdis /Street/ which continues to lead into Vas. Konstandinou Avenue. At this point, where the traffic patterns crisscross, the study proposes to create an inner loop with an uninterrupted flow.

From Syngrou Avenue the flow of traffic will come toward Athens to the front and the side of Athan. Diakos Street. The Athan. Diakos Street will become one-way leading to Vouliagmeni Avenue and Arditttou Street. Arditttou Street will be leading to the center of the city through Vas. Olgas Avenue which will also become one-way through an underpass below Zappeion and which will reemerge with a loop toward Amalias Avenue. There will be three or four uneven passes at two or three points at a depth of approximately 4 meters to facilitate free movement and traffic. The Vas. Olgas Avenue today interrupts the flow of 70,000 vehicles coming toward Syntagma and of 50,000 moving in the other direction although the avenue itself "takes" only 13,000 vehicles.

The complete project for the unification of the archeological program is expected to cost at today's figures around 2 billion drachmas. This sum is nevertheless very modest when we compare it to the pressing need to provide the capital with a clean breath of air and to relieve the archeological area from the suffocating gas fumes.

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